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Allison: Vertical Price-Nonprice Dichotomy

AN ANALYSIS OF THE VERTICAL PRICE-NONPRICE
DICHOTOMY
by
JOHN

R.

ALLISON*

ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

The Policy Debate

The debate concerning the appropriateness of existing antitrust standards
for distribution (vertical) restrictions continues unabated. Some observers have
criticized current national antitrust policy, which treats vertical price restraints
(usually referred to as either resale price maintenance or vertical price fixing)
as per se illegal and vertical nonprice restraints as illegal only if found unduly
anticompetitive under the rule of reason, as being seriously lacking in theoretical
unity.' These commentators usually contend that resale price maintenance, like
vertical nonprice restraints, should be judged under the rule of reason 3 A few
have even called expressly for a rule of per se legality for all forms of vertical
restraint On the other hand, current policy toward vertical restrictions is not
without scholarly support. 4
* The Spence Centennial Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of Business, The University

of Texas at Austin; J.D. 1972, Baylor University.
'See, e.g., R. BORK. THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 280-98 (1978); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per
Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Butler & Baysinger, Vertical
Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, TransactionCost Economics, and Organization Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009 (1983); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Liebeler, 1983 Economic Review of
Antitrust Developments: The Distinction Between Price and Nonprice Distribution Restrictions, 31
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 384 (1983); Mathewson & Winter, An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15RAND
J. ECON. 27 (1984); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
2
See, e.g., Baxter, Vertical Restraints and Resale Price Maintenance: A "Rule of Reason" Approach, 14
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 13(1982); Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U.L.
REV. 521 (1984); Phillips & Mahoney, Unreasonable Rules and Rules of Reason: Economic Aspects of
Vertical Price-Fixing, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 99 (1985); White, Vertical Restraints in Antitrust Law: A
Coherent Model, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 327 (1981).
3
See, e.g., Butler & Baysinger, supra note 1;Easterbrook, supra note 1;Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
4
See, e.g., Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic
Analysis, and Sylvania, 64 IOwA L. REV. 461 (1979); Cann, Vertical Restraints and the "Efficiency" Influence: Does Any Room Remain for More Traditional Antitrust Values and More Innovative Antitrust
Policies?, 24 AM.BUS. L.J. 483 (1987); Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1095 (1986); Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417; Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should Make Cases, 12 J. CORP. L. 1 (1986); Gould
& Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L.J. 722 (1967); Gould & Yamey, Professor
Bork on Vertical Price Fixing: A Rejoinder, 77 YALE L.J. 936 (1968); Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters:
The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487 (1983); Pitofsky,
The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. i (1978).
See also Steiner, The Nature of Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 143 (1985) (supporting existing
rules, except for assertion that vertical nonprice restraints may be even more anticompetitive than resale
price maintenance).
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Resolution of Free-RiderProblems
The kernel of the arguments most often voiced by those critical of current
policy is that the motives for and effects of resale price maintenance usually
are the same as in the case of vertical nonprice restraints. Critical scholars frequently assert that the usual motives for both vertical price and nonprice restraints
are the enhancement of distribution efficiency and stimulation of interbrand
competition through the resolution of free-rider problems.5 In other words, if
local promotion, point-of-sale service, and other demand-stimulating activities
by distribution channel members (distributors or dealers) 6 are an important part
of the marketing effort for a particular product, the manufacturer or other supplier must adopt some system to insure optimal levels of these activities. Such
activities normally require substantial investment by dealers, thus creating a
climate for opportunistic behavior. If a particular dealer can benefit from the
demand-stimulating activities of other dealers while foregoing such activities
himself, he can operate at a significant cost advantage. Free riding on the costly, demand-stimulating activities of other dealers, so the argument goes, will
often be detected by those engaging in these activities, thus diminishing their
incentive to continue doing so. Without some type of distribution channel control by the supplier, it is theorized that dealers may ultimately not engage in
these activities even though they would be better off if all of them did so.
The type of free riding discussed here, and that most frequently serving
as the theoretical foundation for critics of current antitrust policy, is that involving product-specific services. Other types of free riding are possible, of
course, such as opportunistic capitalization by a lower reputation dealer on the
decision of a higher reputation dealer to carry the goods of (and lend its goodwill to) a supplier whose brand is not yet as well established as is the name
of the high-reputation dealer. Although free riding of this latter type is becoming somewhat more popular in the literature as a vertical restraints justification, it still is not offered as a justification for distribution restrictions with
the fervor and frequency of alleged free riding on product-specific services7
5

For more detailed discussions of free riding, see, e.g., R. BORK. supra note 1; Bork, supra note 1, at
430-38; Butler & Baysinger, supra note 1, at 1023-24, 1060-63; Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want
Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcON. 86, 89-96 (1960).
It also has been argued that vertical restraints can be productive of efficiency in ways other than the
solving of free-rider problems, such as facilitating the recruitment of new dealers. See, e.g., Louis, Vertical DistributionalRestraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a
PartialPer Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275, 296-300 (1976).
6
The term "distributor" frequently is used to describe a distribution channel member at the wholesale
level, while the term "dealer" most often is used to describe one at the retail level. In this article, the
terms are used interchangeably, and "dealer" frequently is used generally to denote any downstream channel
member.
7
For arguments that quality-certification services may form the basis for another type of free-rider justification, see Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing,and the Economics of Retailing Services,
79 Nw. U.L. REV. 736, 744-48 (1984); Marvel & McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenanceand Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984); Oster, The F7C v. Levi Strauss: An Analysis of the Economic
Issues, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FTC VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES 47, 62-67 (R. Lafferty, R. Lande,

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
& J. Kirkwood ed. 1984). Goldberg also argues that other
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Use of Vertical Restrictions to Solve Distribution Problems
Although there is lively debate about the actual regularity and importance
of free riding in distribution channels, it is clear that some free riding does
occur.8 Various distribution channel controls may be employed in an attempt
to prevent free-rider problems. Supplier-monitored contractual requirements
for prescribed levels of promotion, service, and so forth are one way. Several
forms of vertical restriction also may be used for this purpose. Resale price
maintenance precludes intrabrand price competition among dealers and, consequently, diminishes the incentive for free riding because the cost advantage
resulting from free riding cannot be used to undercut other dealers. Vertical
nonprice restraints can be used for the same purpose, because they also limit
intrabrand competition and prevent realization of a competitive advantage from
free riding. Nonprice restraints include restrictions on the territory within which
or the customers to whom the dealer can resell, requirements that a dealer operate
only from a designated location, profit passover clauses requiring a dealer to
pay a portion of the proceeds from an out-of-territory sale to another dealer
whose area was encroached, guarantees to dealers of several types of exclusive
distribution rights, and other variations on a similar theme.
Problems of Application
There is little room for doubt that the dichotomy in the legal standards
applied to vertical price and nonprice restraints has produced significant application problems. Perhaps the most perplexing problem is the not infrequent
difficulty encountered by courts in distinguishing price from nonprice restrictions As we have seen, the demand-stimulating activities that are supposed
to be encouraged by vertical nonprice restraints can be quite costly to the dealer,
thus giving a significant cost advantage to the dealer who does not engage in
those activities. When this advantage is used by the lower-cost dealer to fund
price competition, the supplier's resulting concern about this dealer's failure
to perform the required service or promotion may have originated when the
supplier learned of the discounting (often from other dealers). As a consequence,
even when the supplier had not attempted to control or substantially influence
dealers' resale prices, the supplier's investigation of the recalcitrant dealer and
ing scarce shelf space, provide justifications for vertical restrictions because they are similarly susceptible

to free riding. Goldberg, supra, at 738-44.
'Some observers have been skeptical of the free-rider justification for distribution restrictions, especially
as it relates to product-specific services. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
382-83 (1977); Barrett, Restrictive Distribution and the Assault of the "Free Riders," 7 J. CORP. L. 467

(1982); Flynn, supra note 4, at 1130-32; Gerhart, supra note 4, at 431-36; Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1492-93;
Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 694-95 (1983); Steiner, supra note
4, at 187-89. For a discussion of several ways in which free-rider problems can be solved without using
distribution restrictions, see Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An Essay on Vertical Restrictions
and Consumer Information, 67 IowA L. REv. 981 (1982).
9

This problem is discussed by the Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762

(1984). See also, Liebeler, supra note I, at 388-91 (pointing to application difficulties, among other reasons,
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
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attempted enforcement of the dealer's promotion and service obligations may
take on a price-motivated aura. Thus, in the formulation and implementation
of distribution controls, business planning is more difficult and the legal risk
less predictable than if the distinction between price and nonprice restrictions
were clearer or if the same legal standards applied to both.
Motivations and Effects
Despite these difficulties, application of a dual legal standard to distribution restrictions may be warranted on policy grounds if 1) vertical price restrictions are motivated by competitively illegitimate objectives with substantially
greater frequency than are vertical nonprice restrictions or 2) substantial adverse
effects on competition are more likely to result from price restraints than from
nonprice restraints. The existence of anticompetitive motives is important primarily because such motives increase the chances that conduct such as the implementation of a vertical restriction will have actual anticompetitive effects,
and decrease the chances that such conduct will have offsetting procompetitive
effects.
Regarding the question of motives, although enhancement of distribution
efficiency and consequent promotion of interbrand competition through the resolution of a free-rider problem is often asserted as the justification for a distribution restriction, there can be other motivations that are not as easily justified from the perspective of national competition policy. For example, vertical restrictions on intrabrand competition, especially resale price maintenance,
can be employed as a facilitating mechanism for interbrand supplier collusion.
The reason for this horizontal-vertical relationship is that colluding suppliers
are likely to have less incentive to cheat by surreptitiously cutting prices when
each employs resale price maintenance. A member of a supplier cartel who
cheats presumably does so to increase wholesale volume. If that seller's downstream channel members cannot use the resulting cost advantage to compete
for additional sales at their level because they are constrained by resale price
maintenance, they are not likely to buy more from the supplier. Thus, the supplier probably has essentially the same market share with a lower profit margin.
In addition, the existence of resale price maintenance may provide members
of the supplier cartel with another means for policing compliance because price
cutting at wholesale may produce a violation of the resale price maintenance
policy downstream. In other words, the supplier's price cutting may actually
achieve its objective downstream by inducing more sales to dealers who then
attempt to increase their sales volume by cutting prices in contravention of the
resale price maintenance system. This action, in turn, will normally produce
complaints by other dealers who do not choose to price compete. Other sellers
will not find it difficult to discover such complaints.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
Even if other sellers do not discover these complaints, or if there were 4
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not any made, pricing activities of downstream channel members often will
be more visible and thus more discernible to other participants in the seller
cartel than the pricing activities of sellers themselves, thus giving sellers a basis
for drawing inferences about the wholesale prices of cartel members from the
structure of downstream pricing.
From a public policy standpoint, the vertical restriction is likely to be more
easily detected by antitrust enforcers than the seller-level conspiracy because
of the usually much larger number of participants in the vertical restriction
and the frequently greater visibility of pricing at lower levels in the distribution channel. Intuitively, it would seem that the use of vertical restraints to
facilitate supplier collusion would be greater in the case of resale price
maintenance than in the case of vertical nonprice restrictions, thus supporting
a harsher legal standard for the former. This supposition has not been satisfactorily substantiated, however.' 0
In addition, either a vertical price or nonprice restriction can be employed
as an implementing device for dealer collusion. Pressuring the supplier to impose various distribution restrictions can be an ideal way to operationalize the
channel members' agreement. There often will not be enough evidence to prove
a conspiracy among these dealers, but if the genesis of the restriction was at
the dealer level, the underlying motivation is not as likely to have been the
achievement of distribution efficiencies or enhancement of service and promotion. Again, the horizontal conspiracy is often more difficult to detect than
the vertical restrictions. Indeed, even if there was not a dealer cartel, distribution restrictions resulting from dealers' independent or interdependent pressuring
of the supplier may be less likely to have been motivated by the supplier's service/promotion concerns. I
Again, if these or other less justifiable motives are more likely to be the
producing cause of vertical price restraints than vertical nonprice restraints,
a stricter legal standard for the former may be warranted because of the in0
1n Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 (1977), the Court indicated that resale
price maintenance is more likely than vertical nonprice restrictions to be used as a supplier cartel facilitator,
but provided no substantiation. At least one writer had earlier rejected this view. Bork, supra note I, at 415.
For general discussions of the possibility of vertical restrictions serving to facilitate supplier collusion.
see, e.g., L. SULLIVAN. supra note 8, at 385; Bowman, The Prerequisitesand Effects of Resale Price
Maintenance, 22 U. CHt. L. REV. 825, 844-48 (1955); Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 534-40; Telser, supra
note 5, at 96-99; White, supra note 2, at 340-41; Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 967-68 (1979).
Some observers have expressed skepticism about the likelihood of resale price maintenance being used
to facilitate supplier collusion with any significant frequency. See Bork, supra note I, at 411-15; Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 141-42; Ornstein, Resale Price Maintenance and Cartels, 30 ANTITRUST BULL.
401 (1985).
' For general discussions of the possibility of vertical restrictions serving to facilitate dealer collusion,
see, e.g., T. OVERSTREET. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
13-19 (1983); L. SULLIVAN. supra note 8, at 383-84; Posner, supra note I, at 17.
Some observers also have expressed skepticism about the likelihood of resale price maintenance being
used more than rarely to facilitate dealer collusion. See Bork, supra note 1, at 405-10; Easterbrook, supra
note 10.
at IdeaExchange@UAkron,
141-42; Ornstein, supra1988
note I, by
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creased chances of adverse competitive effects.' 2
If we assume that a supplier's employment of distribution restrictions was
motivated by competitively positive objectives, we then must consider the
possibility that other factors may cause these restrictions to have anticompetitive
effects. In this regard, a foundational principle is that a truly vertical restriction normally has a direct impact only on intrabrand competition. The overall
effect of a vertical restriction depends, however, on a number of interrelated
variables, including but not limited to 1) the degree of market power possessed
by the manufacturer or other supplier imposing the restriction, 2) even without
substantial supplier market power, the position of the product as being either
established or recently introduced, 3) the relative intensity of interbrandcompetition, 4) the historical role and importance of intrabrandcompetition in the
distribution of this product, 5) the extent to which vertical restrictions are
employed in the remainder of the market, 6) the existence of additional restrictions or other factors indicating that the intrabrand effect may have spillover
interbrand effects, 7) the existence or nonexistence of feasible, less competitively
restrictive alternatives for achieving legitimate distribution objectives, 8) the
existence and substantiality of entry barriers in the relevant markets, and 9)
the relative differentiated or fungible nature of the product in question. 3 Again,
if vertical price restrictions are significantly more likely than vertical nonprice
restrictions to produce adverse effects on competition, application of a harsher
standard to the former is probably warranted. Some of these variables could
not be explored in the present study because the necessary data was unavailable
in the selected sample. Those factors chosen for analysis are discussed later
in the article.
12 Another possible motive for vertical restraints may be to facilitate price discrimination. A seller wishing
to exploit greater market power in one downstream market than in another may sell at different prices,
or at the same prices in the face of different costs. Dealers can largely overcome such discrimination by
arbitrage; i.e., a favored dealer can resell to a disfavored one at a price between the prices charged by
the seller to the two dealers. Vertical restrictions can prevent arbitrage. Vertical nonprice restrictions, such
as those confining dealers to particular territories, are more efficacious for this purpose than resale price
maintenance. Because price discrimination is regarded as inefficient in some circumstances, this phenomenon
may support a conclusion that resale price maintenance should not receive harsher legal treatment than
vertical nonprice restrictions. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 548-61. Price discrimination as a possible
motive is not examined in this study because there seems to be little doubt that nonprice restrictions may
further such a purpose and that resale price maintenance does not.
3
An extraordinary amount of scholarship has attempted to analyze these and other factors that may have
a bearing on the effects of vertical restrictions. In addition to those authorities cited supra notes 1-12, the
following is a small but representative sample: Carstensen, Vertical Restraintsand the Schwinn Doctrine:
Rules for the Creation and Dissipation of Economic Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 771 (1976);
Carstensen & Dahlson, Vertical Restraints in Beer Distribution: A Study of the Business Justifications
for and Legal Analysis of Restricting Competition, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 1; Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing,
Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985); Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1968);
Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV.
91 (1979); Meehan & Larner, A ProposedRule of Reason for Vertical Restraints on Competition, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 195 (1981); Strasser, Vertical Territorial Restraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and
Proposed New, Rule, 1977 DUKE L.J. 775: Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After
Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 13 (1980).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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THE NATURE AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The present study seeks to determine whether there is substantial credible
evidence either supporting or refuting the existing legal dichotomy between
vertical price and nonprice restraints. In other words, does the evidence in-

dicate that there is anything really "different" about distribution systems in
which the supplier has attempted to directly control dealers' resale prices that

justifies today's harsher legal standard for resale price maintenance? The unit
of study is the restricted distribution system, i.e., a distribution system in which
the manufacturer or other supplier has placed controls on downstream channel

members relating to price, territory, or customer type, or otherwise has limited
intrabrand competition by granting to channel members any of several types
of exclusive distribution rights.
Sample Selection

1. Initial Parameters
Because much of the information relating to particular distribution systems
is perceived by suppliers as legally sensitive, and is not within the scope of

periodic reporting requirements for publicly held firms, a choice was made
to examine those distribution systems that had been subjected to legal challenges
resulting in reported court decisions.
The legal status of a given restriction obviously affects the seller's choice

of restriction. To remove this bias, the 1967-77 period was chosen for study
because both price and nonprice restraints were per se illegal during this time.

The per se illegal status of resale price maintenance, adopted by the Supreme
Court in 1911, t 4 continued in these years and thereafter. In 1967 the Court ruled
nonprice restraints to be per se illegal, as well, in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co. 15 The Court overruled Schwinn in 1977, in Continental TV,

Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
price restrictions.

16

and reverted to a rule of reason analysis for non-

14 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Although the Court did not
expressly adopt a per se rule in Dr. Miles, the rationale it employed was later interpreted as manifesting
such a rule. See H. HOVENKAMP. ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 258 (1984).
5388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Schwinn case left some characterization issues. While territorial customer
and resale restrictions were illegal per se under Schwinn, there continued to be questions whether location
clauses and some other variations on the same theme were within the scope of this per se prohibition.
See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN. supra note 8, at 406-11. The fact that characterization issues remained does not
affect the validity of the chosen sample, however, because per se rules always create characterization issues.
In any case in which legality depends on how particular conduct is denominated, a premium is placed
on the judicial act of denomination. See Allison, Ambiguous Price Fixing and the Sherman Act: Simplistic
Labels or Unavoidable Analysis?, 16 HoUS. L. REV. 761 (1979). The per se rule against resale price
maintenance similarly created, and continues to create, the same kinds of characterization issues. See.
e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (concluding that distributional price restrictions in consignment arrangements can constitute illegal resale price maintenance).
16433 U.S.
36 (1977).
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1988
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Exclusion of Unchallenged Restrictions

Use of this sample excludes those restricted distribution systems not subjected to legal challenge. When empirical analysis of legal standards is attempted, inclusion of only those instances of conduct that had produced legal
challenges could bias the data toward factors indicating illegality. By focusing
on the time period in which both categories of restriction were per se illegal,
however, the present study substantially negates this problem. The reason is
that this study seeks to identify factors influencing the likely purposes and effects of distribution restrictions, and these factors have no bearing on the question of legality when a per se rule is applied.
3.

Exclusion of Settled Claims

The chosen sample also excludes those distribution restrictions subjected
to legal challenge but not resulting in reported court decisions. Thus, lawsuits
that were settled out of court are not reflected. There is no objective method
for determining whether exclusion of these situations affects the results in a
significant way, because so many variables influence the decision to settle out
of court. Most antitrust cases involving vertical restrictions are treble damage
suits brought against suppliers by terminated dealers or distributors claiming
that the termination resulted from their refusal to comply with an allegedly
illegal distribution restriction. One might assume that the exclusion of settled
claims from the study would increase the proportion of distribution restrictions having minimal chances of success, because the prospect of receiving
treble damages might cause plaintiffs to be less likely to settle claims having
only minimal chances of success and to continue to pursue them in litigation.
A contrary assumption is equally plausible, however: the prospect of treble
damage liability may lead a larger number of defendants to press for settlement
of claims having minimal chances of success, thus decreasing the proportion
of unmeritorious claims within the sample. These offsetting possibilities, coupled
with the existence of other randomly occurring and often immeasurable variables
affecting the likelihood of out-of-court settlement, probably result in a wash.
In addition, the fact that the per se rule causes the factors examined in this
study to have no direct bearing on the probability of a claim's ultimate success
or failure leads to the conclusion that excluding settled cases has no significant
impact.
4.

Exclusion of Unreported Decisions

The choice of sample similarly excludes court decisions that were not formally reported. The rules guiding a federal court's determination whether to
formally publish its decision vary among federal districts and circuits; the percentage of decisions published also varies significantly. Cases that are dismissed
at an early stage in the proceedings are less likely to result in published opin-

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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ions, thus possibly causing the sample to included a larger proportion of challenged restrictions in which the plaintiffs claim has somewhat greater merit.
Once again, because courts' decisions whether to publish are characterized by
a not insubstantial degree of randomness, and because the focus of the study
has little to do with factors affecting legality, exclusion of unreported decisions
also has minimal impact on the appropriateness of the sample. 7
5.

Exclusion of Settled and Unappealed FTC Proceedings

Finally, limitation of the sample to reported court decisions excludes
distribution restrictions challenged by the Federal Trade Commission that were
either resolved informally or that were resolved formally within the Commission's administrative process without subsequent review by a federal appeals
court. One may logically assume that the Commission would be less likely
to make frivolous challenges than a private plaintiff in a treble damage action,
and that exclusion from the sample of most FTC-challenged restrictions would
increase the proportion of marginal claims in the sample. For many of the same
reasons previously discussed, the impact of this exclusion is likely to be minimal
or nonexistent. Moreover, if this or other exclusions were to have an effect on
the sample, any such effect would almost certainly be manifested equally in
price and nonprice restraints during the period of measurement and would not
influence comparisons between the two categories.
Methodology
1.

Search Design

Two intentionally overbroad searches of the Lexis data base were conducted.
Each was limited to reported decisions in federal district courts, courts of appeal, and the United States Supreme Court during the 1967-77 period. One search
sought all such cases containing the key word "Schwinn," in order to retrieve
those containing a reference to the Supreme Court's 1967 Schwinn decision which
adopted the rule of per se illegality for vertical nonprice restraints. It is extremely unlikely that a court would have dealt with a claim relating to a vertical nonprice restriction during this period without citing Schwinn. The second search sought all cases containing either "Dr. Miles," "Colgate," or "ParkeDavis." These terms were elements in three of the landmark Supreme Court
decisions of earlier years involving resale price maintenance. 8 Again, it is highly
unlikely that a court dealing with a claim of resale price maintenance during
this period would have failed to refer to at least one of these precedents.
17See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals:
The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 592 (1981). See also Allison, Arbitration Agreements and
Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REV.
219, 242 & n.181 (1986).
"United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300 (1919);
Dr. Miles Medical Co.1988
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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These two searches yielded an initial total of 639 cases. Of this number,
124 were found to be duplicates. The remaining 515 were read initially for the
purpose of consolidation and further elimination. The designedly overbroad
nature of the searches causes retrieval of several irrelevant cases that were quickly
eliminated. For example, the overbreadth of the "Schwinn" search produced
several cases involving Arnold, Schwinn & Co. as a party to patent litigation.
2.

Consolidation of Litigation Involving the Same Distribution System

A substantial number of decisions were consolidated because they involved
the same litigation at different stages. The same lawsuit may have produced
two or more opinions by the trial court relating to matters such as preliminary
injunction or summary judgment, as well as a final opinion after trial. One
or more opinions at the appellate level also may have been generated in the
same case. All were read carefully, because different bits of background information occasionally can be extracted from opinions at different stages. In addition to consolidating those judicial opinions relating to the same litigation,
different cases involving the same restricted distribution system were consolidated.
3.

Exclusion of Cases with Pre-Schwinn Facts

A case was retained for study only if the facts indicated that a distribution
restriction was in use after the 1967 Schwinn case and before the 1977 Sylvania
case. The search yielded a number of cases that were litigated during the first
part of the 1967-77 period but that involved facts occurring prior to Schwinn.
If the relevant facts did not extend past Schwinn, the case was excluded.
Moreover, a case was excluded even if the circumstances indicated a significant likelihood that the facts were pre-Schwinn. For example, decisions by district
courts as early as 1969 and courts of appeal as early as 1970 were scrutinized
closely for circumstantial dating evidence when the courts' factual recitations
did not give dates. Almost all such cases were excluded. Occasionally, one
was retained when circumstantial evidence preponderated toward a conclusion
that the relevant facts extended past Schwinn, as when a 1969 or 1970 decision
involved summary judgment or preliminary injunction.
4.

Exclusion of Fair Trade Cases

Although the selection of the 1967-77 period substantially purged the data
of bias caused by differing legal standards, and solved most of the other potential difficulties involved in isolating comparable sets of data, there remained
one problem of potential bias at the initial stage of sample selection. Resale
price maintenance under certain conditions remained exempt from antitrust
challenge under state Fair Trade laws until 1975. These laws existed under
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
authorization granted by Congress in the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, 10
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which were repealed in 1975.19 By the beginning of the period in question,
however, the Fair Trade laws of many states had been repealed, and many more
had been invalidated by state judicial action under state constitutional provisions. 20 Some state court decisions had struck down these laws in their entirety, and many had declared only the laws' nonsigner provisions unconstitutional.?'
Invalidation of nonsigner provisions, which permitted sellers to enforce their
resale price maintenance systems against all downstream channel members on
the basis of a single contract with one member, made implementation of resale
price maintenance much more difficult and rendered those Fair Trade laws largely
ineffective. Consequently, by the beginning of the period only about one-third
of the states had truly effective Fair Trade laws and, even when legal, enforce22
ment of contracts made pursuant to such laws was frequently difficult. Furthermore, many uncertainties about judicial interpretation of these laws caused
reliance upon them to be risky. For example, dual distribution by a seller (sales
in both wholesale and retail markets) created substantial risks that a state's Fair
Trade law would not be applicable. 23 In addition, sellers encountered great difficulty in sufficiently controlling national distribution so that resale price
maintenance could be practiced in those states where lawful but avoided in those
where unlawful24 These risks increased, and the practicability of lawfully maintaining resale prices in a regional or national distribution network decreased,
as fewer states had effective Fair Trade Laws. By the beginning of the period
under study, the risks were great and the practicability low. Ultimately, the search
in this study turned up a very small number of decisions in which the seller
apparently had attempted to rely on Fair Trade protection, and these were
eliminated from the sample. Any remaining bias in the data resulting from the
presence of a state Fair Trade law would seem to be quite minor, for the reasons
discussed above.
19 The Miller-Tydings Act, Ch. 690, Title VIII 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937), amended Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)), by adding a proviso permitting
states to legalize minimum resale price maintenance. In Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384 (1951), the Supreme Court held that this proviso only permitted state laws to validate consensual vertical price fixing between the actual parties to the agreement. The McGuire Act, Pub. L. No.
542, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (note) (1982)), further amended Section I to authorize
state Fair Trade laws to include nonsigners, i.e., to bind all dealers or distributors of a good sold under
a resale price maintenance agreement in that state, regardless of whether the particular dealer or distributor
was a party to such an agreement. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(1975), repealed the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts.
20

See P. AREEDA. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 663-64 (1981); L. ScHwATrz. J. FLYNN. & H. FIRST. FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST 590-97 (1983); L. SULLIVAN. supra note 8, at 378-79;
6041.
2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21 Id.

REG. REP. (CCH) 6041. Regarding the difficulty of specifically enforcing price maintenance
contracts under Fair Trade laws, see P. AREEDA. supra note 20, at 663-64.
23
United States v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
24
For an illustration of the difficulty encountered by a national marketer when attempting to rely on state
60, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
Fair Trade laws, see United States v. Revlon, Inc., 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH)
Published
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Exclusion of Restrictions in Vertically Integrated Enterprises

The Schwinn search turned up a number of cases involving termination
of suppliers' agents in distribution systems that were completely integrated. These
were ultimately eliminated because, in a price-nonprice classification scheme,
the nature of the plaintiffs' complaints in cases arising from vertically integrated
distribution systems can only produce a nonprice classification. Moreover, these
cases do not really represent "restricted distribution systems" in the legal sense.
The problems encountered in this regard are yet another manifestation of the
application difficulties inherent in the price-nonprice dichotomy.
6.

Exclusion of Tying and Exclusive Dealing Cases

The searches also yielded a number of cases involving tying arrangements,
under which the supplier conditions the availability of one product on the dealer's
acceptance of an additional product, and exclusive dealing arrangements, under
which the dealer agrees either directly or indirectly to not buy from the supplier's competitors. Although the motives for tying and exclusive dealing may
be different in many cases, their effects often will be similar. The important
point for present purposes, however, is that these two conceptually related restrictions normally are energized by different objectives and produce different ef2
fects than resale price maintenance or the various nonprice intrabrand restraints. 5
In addition, the key words used in the Lexis search were not designed to retrieve
cases involving only tying or exclusive dealing, and such cases yielded by this
particular search would not provide a suitable sample of these restrictions.
Therefore, cases involving only tying or exclusive dealing agreements were
eliminated from the study even though they could be included within a broad
conception of the vertical nonprice restraints classification. However, in those
instances where the restricted distribution system included tying or exclusive
dealing in addition to resale price maintenance or intrabrand nonprice restrictions, the case was retained for study.
After all consolidations and eliminations, cases representing 113 distribution systems remained for study.
Cases as Data Sources
Judicial decisions possess certain inherent infirmities as data sources, and
must be used carefully. The most important factors dictating caution in the use
of cases as data sources in the present study are 1) the likely irrelevance of
ultimate legal conclusions to the objectives of a study using cases as data sources,
2) the effect of the per se rule on data availability, and 3) the issuance of judicial
25See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 242-43 (discusses similarity of tying and exclusive dealing). For

an example of the frequent similarity between exclusive dealing and tying, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. District
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), and Bock, An Economist Appraises Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST
BULL. 117, 126-33 (1985) (discussing this similarity in Jefferson Hospital). See generally Marvel, Exclusive
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
Dealing 25 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1982) (discusses possible motives and effects of exclusive dealing).
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opinions at several different stages in the litigation process.
1. Irrelevance of Legal Conclusions
In this study information derived from these decisions is used to classify
distribution restrictions and to identify certain characteristics of systems employing those restrictions. This particular use of judicial opinions makes the courts'
ultimate conclusions on liability questions irrelevant, because a judicial finding of nonliability may be based on legal requirements having nothing to do
with the objectives of the study. The irrelevance to the present study of judicial
conclusions on liability issues is even more evident in the context of distribution restrictions, because 1) as mentioned earlier, most antitrust cases involving distribution restrictions are brought by private plaintiffs, usually terminated
dealers or distributors claiming that the termination resulted from their noncompliance with illegal vertical restraints, and 2) some of the legal requirements
for proving a violation are more difficult to satisfy in a suit brought by a private
plaintiff than in one brought by the Justice Department or the Federal Trade
Commission. Some of the most important reasons for the decision in this study
to disregard the courts' ultimate legal conclusions are as follows.
First, the applicable statutory provision, Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
can be violated only if it is proved that the challenged conduct resulted from
a "contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy" (i.e., an agreement)3 6 In the
normal case brought by a terminated dealer or distributor, it is not uncommon
for a court to conclude that the statute is inapplicable because the termination
was purely a unilateral action by the supplier rather than being part of an agreement to maintain and enforce distribution restrictions. Because the plaintiff must
produce evidence connecting its termination with an unlawful agreement, this
indicates that restrictions of arguable
result can occur even if other 2evidence
7
legality actually were present.
Second, a court's finding of nonliability may result from its conclusion
that the supplier's termination of this particular distribution channel member
was based on the latter's breach of contract, fraud, poor performance, or other
reasons unrelated to the maintenance of distribution restrictions. Again, this
evidence of restrictions having
result can occur even when there is substantial
28
questionable.
least
at
is
that
a legal status
2615

U.S.C. § I (1982).

27See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec.
Corp., 780 E2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986) cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987) (No. 85-1910); Russell Stover
Candies, Inc. v. F.T.C., 718 F2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
28
See, e.g., Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs. Inc., 531 F2d 910 (8th Cir. 1976); 0. M. Droney
Beverage Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 365 F. Supp. 1067 (D. Minn. 1973). See also Allison, Complaining
Dealers, the Terminated Price Cutter, and Sherman Act ConspiracyDoctrine, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1985)
(discussing importance of evidence regarding cause for termination in cases also involving some evidence
of resale price maintenance, with emphasis on the agreement issue).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
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Third, a private plaintiff may lose an antitrust case by not producing sufficient evidence of its damages, even though it has proved a violation of the law.
Fourth, even when a judge or jury concludes that no illegal distribution
restrictions are present, that conclusion often reflects an interpretation of ambiguous and conflicting evidence that easily could have gone the other way.
A fifth reason, closely related to the fourth, is that the evidence in such
a case may indicate rather clearly that some form of restriction on intrabrand
competition did exist even though the court was unable to label the restriction
as one of those species condemned by the Sherman Act. Legal rules, especially those of a per se nature, frequently place a premium on the labeling or
characterization of conduct.2 9 The fourth and fifth reasons suggest that a restricted
distribution system does not have to rise to a level of illegality for that system
to be an appropriate item in a study of motives and effects even when a finding
of nonliability related substantively to the restriction itself.
2.

Effect of the Per Se Rule on Data Availability

The reason for selecting the 1967-77 period for study was to eliminate, as
nearly as possible, any influence that different legal standards might have on
a supplier's choice of distribution restriction. The use of this period, however,
also produced an additional problem relating to the quality and quantity of data
available in the cases. As discussed previously, application of a per se rule of
illegality causes many of the factors relevant to this study to be irrelevant to
the issues in the case. Consequently, it is to be expected that less information
on the purposes and effects of particular distribution restrictions would be found
in these cases than if the rule of reason were applicable.
Although the per se rule clearly has an impact on the amount of data
available, this impact is less than one might think, and these cases did contain
much relevant information. The reason is that, in cases involving distribution
restrictions, especially those in which a terminated dealer or distributor claims
that its termination resulted from refusal to comply with an illegal restriction,
there frequently are close factual questions pertaining to the issues of 1) whether
there was an agreement ("contract, combination, or conspiracy") as required
by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 2) whether the alleged restriction appropriately
can be classified as either resale price maintenance or a nonprice resale restriction, and 3) whether the particular dealer or distributor was actually terminated
for refusal to comply with such a restriction or for some other, legally permissible reason.
A court's inquiry into these issues often generates substantial evidence regarding distribution problems and methods in the market in question, the origins
29

See Allison, supra note 15; Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for
Reducing the Chaos, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593 (1980); Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964).
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of the supplier's use of the challenged restriction, the supplier's and dealer's
conduct leading up to the dispute, and the supplier's probable reasons (from
both the supplier's and dealer's perspectives) for termination of the dealer. In
many cases, evidence of the factual background also outlines the nature of the
business, the scope of the market, and this supplier's position in the market.
3.

Opinions from Different Stages of the Litigation Process

Because reported decisions may be issued at several different stages in the
judicial process, they are not equally useful information sources. A decision
and concomitant opinion on the merits written after trial usually will be a more
fruitful source than one rendered in response to a petition for a preliminary
injunction or a motion for summary judgment. On the other hand, it is not
essential that an opinion be based upon a full trial in order for it to contain
useful information. It is necessary, however, for the opinion at least to reveal
the existence of evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that some
restriction on intrabrand competition probably existed, regardless of the court's
ultimate conclusions on particular legal issues. Based on this standard, decisions based solely on the pleadings were excluded automatically. Others,
however, including those rendered in response to a petition for a preliminary
injunction or motion for summary judgment and those rendered after trial, were
included so long as they reflected sufficient evidence to support the above inference. More will be said about the process of drawing this inference in the
discussion of how cases were placed in the price and nonprice categories.
Categorizing the Restrictions
The 113 distribution systems under study were separated into price and nonprice categories. In many cases, distribution restrictions clearly involved either
resale price maintenance or one of the several variations of nonprice restriction. As one would expect, however, several problems were encountered in making the price-nonprice distinction. The nature of these problems and the methods
used to resolve them are discussed below.
1.

Problems of Proof

As previously discussed, for several reasons a court's legal conclusions
are largely irrelevant to the objectives of this study. This proposition holds true
even when a conclusion of nonliability is based on findings that illegal restrictions did not exist. To be sure, some cases were eliminated from the study
because they contained no evidence of any attempted restriction on intrabrand
competition. Decisions based solely on the pleadings were excluded, as were
several other cases in which the plaintiffs evidence was so weak as not to permit an inference that the supplier had any substantial interest in limiting intrabrand competition. Regardless of whether the court's decision was rendered
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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a preliminary injunction or motion for summary judgment, a case was retained
for study if the court's opinion revealed sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable
inference by the author that restrictions on intrabrand competition existed. The
need for drawing such inferences in some cases introduced an unavoidable element of subjectivity into the study, but an awareness of this fact and an insistence on significant evidence of intrabrand restrictions should have minimized
the impact of such subjectivity.
2.

Making the Price-Nonprice Distinction

A case was treated as one involving a vertical price restriction if it contained sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that the supplier
had made a substantial effort to directly control the dealer's resale price. A
case was treated as one involving a vertical nonprice restriction if it contained
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that the supplier had made
a substantial effort to place limits on intrabrand competition among downstream
channel members in ways not directly involving their resale prices. Distribution systems involving both a price and a nonprice restriction were placed in
the price category because the ultimate objective of this study is to determine
whether there is anything really different about systems in which the supplier
has directly attempted to control resale price that justifies today's harsher legal
30
treatment of vertical price restrictions.
3.

Maximum Vertical Price Fixing

Agreements setting maximum prices were declared per se illegal by the
Supreme Court in 1951 in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons. 31
Although the challenged arrangement did relate to maximum resale prices, it
was imposed on distributors by two suppliers acting in concert and thus was
treated as horizontal rather than vertical price fixing. These two suppliers were
wholly-owned subsidiaries of a common parent, but the law at that time treated
such affiliated companies as separate entities and permitted a finding of conspiracy between them.32 Using Kiefer-Stewart as precedent, in 1968 the Court
3

°Combinations of price and nonprice restrictions are relatively common in situations involving maximum
vertical price fixing, because a manufacturer can use this type of resale price restriction to counteract
the market power acquired by a dealer as a result of an exclusive territory. Most of the distribution systems
in this study having both price and nonprice restraints did involve maximum vertical price fixing. As discussed
in the next subsection, cases of maximum vertical price fixing were segregated from the price restriction
category because they probably are characterized by purposes and effects different from tradtiional resale
price maintenance in most situations. See infra, text accompanying notes 31-38.
Only six cases involved nonprice restrictions coupled with minimum price restrictions. As a precaution
against any results being affected by combinations of price and nonprice restrictions, the price category
minus these six distribution systems was separately analyzed. No significant differences were found between the price category with and without these six systems; consequently, separate results were not reported
for this analysis.
31340 U.S. 211 (1951).
32

The law on this point was changed by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984), in which the Supreme Court ruled that a corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary are a single
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
economic entity and therefore are legally incapable of conspiring under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.16
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held in Albrecht v. Herald Co. that purely vertical maximum price fixing also
is illegal per se.33 Thus, a distribution restriction setting maximum resale prices
was subject to the same per se rule as ordinary resale price maintenance during all but the first year of the period being studied. The absence of a per se
rule for maximum vertical price fixing in the first year of the 1967-77 period
did not affect the study, however, for two reasons: 1) All but one of the cases
involving maximum vertical price fixing were based on facts occurring after
or extending beyond the time when the legal status of the practice was subject
to any doubt. One 1969 case involved facts that arose while there was still some
doubt whether maximum vertical price fixing was per se illegal.3 4 2) Even before
the Albrecht decision in 1968, however, maximum vertical price fixing was of
highly questionable legality. As mentioned, the Kiefer-Stewart case had involved
the fixing of resale prices, and the facts causing the Court to treat the arrangement as horizontal were tenuous and technical. Therefore, even the one case
involving pre-Albrecht facts was retained for study.
A more serious problem with maximum vertical price fixing is that it can
be, and probably is, characterized by different motives and effects than traditional resale price maintenance. Persuasive critical scholarship has focused on
the perceived error in applying the same rule of per se illegality to maximum
vertical price fixing as is applied to resale price maintenance. The most commonly voiced criticism is that maximum vertical price fixing does not represent the same type of limitation on intrabrand competition as traditional resale
on
price maintenance, but instead represents an attempted curb by suppliers
35
members.
channel
distribution
the market power of downstream
Because of this controversy, and because of the very real possibility that
maximum vertical price fixing may be characterized by motives and effects
quite different than those that characterize resale price maintenance or vertical
nonprice restraints, the analysis of distribution systems that were placed within
the price category was done twice. The first analysis included cases of maximum vertical price fixing along with cases of traditional resale price
maintenance; the second excluded maximum price cases and included only traditional resale price maintenance cases. Results were reported separately.
Segregating maximum resale price restrictions created a minor additional
difficulty. A purported maximum can be used as a guise for a defacto minimum
and, in fact, a few of the distribution restrictions in this study were difficult
to classify as maximum or minimum resale price restraints. One possible reason
for this difficulty, of course, is that some of the restrictions may actually have
been covert minimums disguised as maximums. An explanation of at least equal
U.S. 145 (1968).
A. S. Abell Co. v. Chell, 412 E2d 712 (4th Cir. 1969) (relevant facts extended into 1968 but not later).
a"See, e.g., Blair & Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing and the Goals of Antitrust, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV.
43 (1986); Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U.
Published
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FLA. L. REV. 461 (1981); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886 (1981).
33390
34
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plausibility, however, is that the courts sometimes did not attempt to make the
distinction in their opinions because the same legal standards applied to both.
The present study approached this particular problem as it approached others.
Where the totality of reported evidence preponderated toward an inference that
the supplier was primarily interested in putting a ceiling on the dealers resale
prices, the restriction was classified as a maximum price restriction; where
this evidence indicated that the supplier's primary interest was in establishing
a minimum resale price or absolutely controlling the resale price, the restriction was classified as traditional resale price maintenance. In making this distinction, as in making other decisions in this study, evidence from more than one
reported decision involving the same distribution system was used when available
and relevant. For example, there were several instances of litigation within a
close time and geographic proximity involving Crown Central Petroleum Company's distribution system. In one of these cases, the allegation and evidence
indicated a maximum resale price restriction ?6 In another, however, the evidence
demonstrated that the supplier not only set a maximum but also a minimum,
and actually controlled resale price absolutely.3 7 This distribution system was
classified as one involving traditional resale price maintenance. Also supporting this classification was clear evidence of a supplier cartel in the region for
the purpose of preventing price wars.3 8
4.

Pure Exclusive Dealerships

Distribution systems involving pure exclusive dealerships presented a taxonomical problem. Although nonprice restrictions on resale were per se illegal during the period under study, a pure exclusive dealership binding the
supplier to have no other outlet in the area but not restricting the dealer's area
of resale was judged under the rule of reason.3 9 Initially, I perceived this problem as one relating solely to sample selection, and tentatively concluded that
the absence of a per se rule for this type of restriction warranted automatic
exclusion. After further reflection, however, I decided that reasonable arguments
could be developed for retaining pure exclusive dealerships and including them
in the nonprice category. These arguments follow.
a) With regard to a supplier's likely motives in selecting a form of distribution restraint, it frequently is very difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether
a particular distribution system actually involved only territorial exclusives or
also included restrictions on resale. The evidence of both exclusives and resale
16Crown Cent. Petrol. Corp. v. Brice, 427 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Va. 1977).
37
Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petrol. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md. 1975).
38

39

Id.

See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967); Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors Ltd., 416 F2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 355
U.S. 822 (1957). See also P. AREEDA, supra note 20, at 675-83 (discussing exclusive dealerships, with 18
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
many annotated citations); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, at 423-27 (discussing exclusive dealerships).
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restrictions often is circumstantial and the two may be quite difficult to distinguish
in such cases. In other words, the problem can be more one of characterization
than categorization. Moreover, even when a distribution contract expressly provides for an exclusive but places no express restrictions on resale, the evidence
sometimes suggests but does not legally prove the concomitant existence of de
facto territorial resale restrictions. This scenario was likely to be especially
common during the period in question because of the legal standards then applicable.
b) A resale restriction usually is more attractive to the supplier than an
exclusive: the former restricts the dealer's freedom, the latter restricts the supplier's freedom. Moreover, in many situations the intrabrand effects of exclusives
and resale restrictions will be very similar. This combination of factors means
that suppliers normally would be expected to seek resale restrictions over exclusives whenever possible. Since it is logical to assume that suppliers will
have bargaining power superiority with significantly greater frequency than will
dealers, it follows that restricted distribution systems are more likely to contain resale restrictions alone or in combination with exclusives than to contain
exclusives alone, ceteris paribus. The existence during the period in question
of a per se rule for resale restrictions and a rule of reason for exclusives certainly would have affected the supplier's behavior. This behavioral effect would
have been manifested either in the type of restriction the supplier chose to seek,
the method of creating and implementing the restriction, or both. Given the
common evidentiary ambiguities and resulting difficulties in distinguishing exclusives from resale restrictions, as well as the frequently similar intrabrand
effects of the two types of nonprice restraints, during this time period it would
be completely rational and even predictable for a supplier with some degree
of bargaining advantage and a desire to use nonprice restrictions to employ contractual exclusives as a guise for defacto (and often unprovable) resale restrictions.
In those cases in which exclusive dealerships existed and in which the
evidence also suggested but did not prove the simultaneous existence of resale
restrictions, the factors just discussed make it reasonable to infer that resale
restrictions were in fact part of the distribution system. Indeed, these factors
create a substantial probability that most exclusive dealership arrangements during the period also included some form of tacit restriction on resale even if
no evidence in the case even suggested such. Consequently, logic supports retaining for further study those cases involving pure exclusive dealerships despite
the applicability of the rule of reason rather than the per se rule.40
Despite the logic of these arguments, however, the existence of per se standards for both price and nonprice restrictions during the period forms the very
40

See L. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 629-30 (discussing tendency of exclusive dealerships to lead to
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foundation for the present study and the constraints it creates must be adhered
to. To satisfy this fundamental parameter as well as the logical attraction of
retaining pure exclusive dealerships for study, separate analyses were done for
the nonprice category including and excluding systems with pure exclusives.
Results are reported separately.
Ultimately, 47 distribution systems were classified as involving price restrictions (31 when maximum price restrictions were excluded), and 66 were
classified as involving nonprice restrictions (44 when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated).
FACTORS AND FINDINGS

It was recognized early in the study that a number of those factors relevant
to a weighing of the purposes and effects of distribution restrictions could not
be identified from the type of evidence normally discussed in court decisions.
In addition, one factor was included initially but abandoned early in the
course of the study. The extent to which similar vertical restrictions are used
by other suppliers in the market clearly is relevant to the question of a restriction's likely effects. Although there were several instances in which similar
distribution restrictions imposed by two or more suppliers in the same industry
were separately challenged, there was not enough evidence to permit useful
market definitions. Although relevant product markets could have been delineated
in most cases, there usually was almost no evidence to permit any inferences
about geographic markets. Consequently, it was not possible to draw any meaningful conclusions about the extent to which particular distribution restrictions
were employed by suppliers in a given market.
The factors ultimately chosen for testing are as follows: 1) whether the
supplier had substantial market power; 2) whether the product in question was
an established one; 3) whether the product was new or had been newly introduced in the particular geographic area; 3) whether there was evidence of
actual free riding by a dealer or distributor involved in the dispute; 4) whether
there was evidence showing a definite absence of free riding by dealers or
distributors in the particular distribution system; 5) whether there was significant credible evidence that substantial dealer pressure played a role in the institution or enforcement of the restriction, but no evidence of collusion among
such dealers; 6) whether there was significant credible evidence of intrabrand
dealer collusion; 7) whether there was significant credible evidence of interbrand dealer collusion; 8) whether there was significant credible evidence of
interbrand supplier collusion; 9) whether there was significant credible evidence
indicating a likely interbrand effect resulting from the challenged distribution
restriction, but no evidence of interbrand supplier or dealer collusion; 10)
whether the intrabrand restriction was combined with exclusive dealing or tyhttp://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
ing; and 11) whether the evidence indicated only an intrabrand effect resulting 20
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from the challenged restriction. Each of these factors is examined separately
in the following discussion. Included is a statement of the rationale for including
the factor, a description of the method used to test for its presence, and a presentation of the study's findings. These findings are summarized in Table 1 (Price
Restrictions), Table 2 (Price Restrictions Excluding Maximum Vertical Price
Fixing), Table 3 (Nonprice Restrictions), and Table 4 (Nonprice Restrictions
Excluding Pure Exclusive Dealerships). 4 '
Supplier's Market Power
The degree of market power possessed by a supplier has obvious relevance
the
question of whether distribution restrictions employed by that supplier
to
are likely to have substantial adverse effects on competition. The greater is the
supplier's power, the less vigorous is interbrand competition and the more important is the supplier's restriction of intrabrand competition.4 2 In addition, the
extent of a supplier's market power is related to other effects such as an in43
creased likelihood of price discrimination.
Because the per se rule applied to both price and nonprice distribution
restrictions during the period, the supplier's market power was not directly relevant to the ultimate question whether a particular restriction was illegal. However,
a court's discussion of the factual background in a distribution restriction case
commonly will include recitations of facts that do relate to the market power
question. These recitations normally are gratuitous and, therefore, a conservative approach was taken toward their use in the study. Specifically, a supplier was characterized as having substantial market power if the court made
a direct finding of such power or a direct finding that clearly translated into
such power. For example, in United States v. General Electric Co., the court
specifically found that although General Electric no longer had a complete
monopoly of the market for light bulbs, fluorescent tubes, and other "large
lamps' as it had several decades earlier, it still possessed at least 50 percent
of that market.4 4 In Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., the court found
that the supplier was the largest producer of acoustical and nonacoustical ceiling products in the United States. 4 5 These and similar findings in other cases
were treated as sufficient to support an inference that the supplier had substantial market power. In a few instances, notice was taken of common knowledge
41In comparing findings in the price and nonprice categories, I attempted no statistical testing to determine significance levels for any differences I found. Such testing would not be meaningful because 1)
nonprobability sampling was the only available sampling procedure, and 2) some subjective interpretations could not be avoided in identifying distribution system characteristics.
42
See, e.g., Meehan & Larner, supra note 13, at 224-25; Strasser, supra note 13, at 834-36; Gerhart, supra
note 4, at 438-39, 441-43.
43
See, e.g., Carstensen & Dahlson, supra note 13, at 22-23; Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 548-61.
44358 F Supp. 731, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
45548 F.2d 438, 440 (2d Cir. 1977).
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about a particular supplier in drawing an inference of substantial market power.
This, again, was done conservatively, and a company was treated as having
substantial market power only if it was well-known that the company was either
the market leader or was one of the top two or three firms in a tightly oligopolistic
market. For example, it is well known that Anheuser-Busch and General Motors
had substantial power in the early 1970s when legal challenges to their distribution systems appeared in the study. The former was clearly the leading brewer
at the time and had a market share that was steadily rising. The latter had long
been the market leader and had a market share averaging 45 to 50 percent during the period. Similarly, Ford Motor Company was treated as having substantial market power because of its solid position as the second leading firm in
an oligopoly, with about 25 percent of the market during the late 1960s and
early 1970s when legal challenges to its distribution restrictions appeared in
this study.
The treatment of newspapers is illustrative of the conservative approach
employed in identifying suppliers with substantial market power. It is probable
that most of the newspapers appearing in the study possessed such power; indeed, some certainly were monopolists. On the other hand, some of them may
have been the struggling second newspaper in a natural monopoly. In any event,
none of the newspapers appearing in this study were characterized as having
substantial market power, because the exact nature of these geographically
localized markets has not commanded sufficient attention to make the structure of any one of them a matter of common knowledge. In addition, there was
insufficient information in any of the newspaper cases to permit a specific conclusion about market power.
In the price restrictions category, only three out of 47 suppliers (6.4%)
were found to have had substantial market power. When maximum price restrictions were excluded, one of 31 suppliers (3.2%) was found to possess such power.
Perhaps surprisingly, 14 out of 66 suppliers (21.2 %) in the nonprice category
were found to possess substantial market power; when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated the proportion was 10 of 44 (22.7%).
Established Product
One commonly offered justification for distribution restrictions is that they
may be useful in facilitating introduction of a new product or entry into a new
geographic market. The insulation of dealers from intrabrand competition is
sometimes thought to be an appropriate means of inducing them to take risks
attendant to market entry.46 In addition, if it is argued that insulation from intrabrand competition is being used to compensate an established dealer for cer46See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); Preston, Restrictive Distribu-

tion Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 506,
511 (1965); White, supra note 2, at 342.
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tifying the quality of a product, the argument loses validity as the supplier's
product becomes more established itself. 7 Moreover, any adverse competitive
effects of distribution restrictions obviously will be less in the case of relatively new products than for established ones. 48
A conservative approach also was taken in identifying suppliers whose products were established but who were not characterized as having substantial market
power. For a product to be so identified the court must have made specific findings that clearly translated into an established product characterization, or it
must have been undisputable common knowledge that the product had been
in the marketplace for a substantial period of time. Because the substantial market
power characterization is a conceptual subset of the established product characterization, and because of the caution used in identifying firms as possessing substantial market power, a number of firms were probably identified as
merely having an established product that actually possessed substantial market
power. Thus, in addition to including firms with established products who clearly
did not have substantial market power (such as Seven-Up Bottling Co.), the
established product characterization also served to identify suppliers who actually may have had substantial market power but for whom there was insufficient evidence to so identify them (such as Coca-Cola Bottling Co. and the
newspapers).

In the price category, 29 out of 47 firms (61.7 %) were identified as having
established products; when maximum price restrictions were excluded, 17 of
31 (54.8%) were so identified. In the nonprice category, 16 out of 66 firms
(24.2%) had established products; when pure exclusive dealerships were
eliminated the propostion was 11 of 44 (25.0%).
Because the line between the market power and established product
characterizations was occasionally fuzzy, and because the concerns caused by
the two factors are similar in nature (if not in magnitude), a combination of
the two may be meaningful. Combining the market power and established product factors, 32 of 47 firms (68.1%) were identified in the price category. When
maximums were excluded, the number was 18 of 31 (58.1%). In the nonprice
category, 30 of 66 (45.5%) were identified; when pure exclusive dealerships
were eliminated the proportion was 21 of 44 (47.7 %). Although the perceived
incidence of market power was greater in the nonprice category, and the existence of established products was greater in the price category, an aggregation of the two characteristics produced much less variant results. The aggregate
market power-established product characteristic was found more commonly in
47

See, e.g., Oster, supra note 7, at 62-80; Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 7, at 358-59.
48See Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 983 (1985). Comanor argues that vertical restraints involving established products are more likely to reduce consumer welfare than those involving new products or products of new entrants because
in the former situation a much smaller number of customers need the information and services financed
by the higher prices that vertical restrictions produce.
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the price category, but the magnitude of difference probably is not sufficient
to make a compelling case for different legal standards. On the other hand,
the very high level of incidence overall may support an argument that any proposed uniform legal standard for vertical restrictions should be harsher than
the present rule of reason that is applied to nonprice restrictions. However,
when drawing unified conclusions about vertical restrictions in the aggregate,
rather than comparing price and nonprice restrictions, the sampling of only
those distribution restrictions that had been legally challenged could bias the
results toward a greater incidence of market power and established products.
New Product or New Geographic Market
Seeking to identify those distribution systems in which the product was
new or was newly introduced in the subject geographic market represents an
attempt to further focus on a critical factor. As just discussed above, some
observers have offered geographic market entry or new product introduction
as justifications for distribution restrictions. Considering this concept from one
perspective, an attempt has been made to identify suppliers with either market
power or established products. Looking at the concept from another perspective, an attempt then was made specifically to identify distribution systems in
which the product was new. If a supplier's marketing effort really involved the
introduction of a new product, evidence relating to such a fact is the type of
thing a court might be expected to reference when outlining the factual
background of a dispute in which the supplier's distribution restriction is being challenged. A court's development of this factual background usually contains some gratuitous elements, but a significant part of the information does
have a bearing on issues such as how the restriction originated, whether the
statutory "agreement" requirement has been met, how the restriction was enforced, and what led to the dispute in question (that dispute often involving
termination of the plaintiff-dealer).
In the price category, no suppliers were identified from the evidence as
having a new product or entering a new geographic market. In the nonprice
category, 3 of 66 firms (4.5 %) were so identified; when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated, the proportion was 1 of 44 (2.3%). These findings were
a bit surprising and could indicate error in my assumption that this kind of
evidence is a reasonably expectable part of the court's factual background
development. If this assumption was not fundamentally erroneous, these findings clearly do not lend support to the argument that either price or nonprice
restrictions are justified as facilitators of market entry. It is interesting that the
findings on this point and those on the market power and established product
factors seem to be cross-confirming. This confirming relationship with the
previous categories tends to indicate that my assumption was not erroneous.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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Free Riding
As previously discussed, the resolution of free-rider problems is the
justification for distribution restrictions most often voiced in the literature. When
a rule of per se illegality applies, resolution of a free-rider problem certainly
is not a cognizable defense. In this study, however, it was assumed that evidence
indicating a free-rider justification could be expected to surface in a significant percentage of cases in which it actually existed. The basis for this assumption, again, was that most of these cases are brought by terminated distributors
or dealers, and the reason for termination will be a crucial question. The relevant issue would not be expressed in free-rider terms, especially in the 1967-77
period, but would be couched in terms of whether the dealer in fact was terminated for violating an allegedly illegal distribution restriction, or was really
terminated for such failures as not having properly trained personnel, not engaging in sufficient promotional efforts, not providing adequate customer service,
and so on. Credible evidence that a termination was for such a failure indicates
that the dealer may have been a free rider. In addition to its relevance to the
issue of why the dealer was terminated, evidence relating to the dealer's performance is the type of information that creates an overall positive aura for
the party in whose favor it operates, and this party seemingly would have a
strong incentive to produce it. One might logically expect to find evidence of
poor dealer performance introduced in a larger portion of the cases in which
such evidence existed than evidence of good dealer performance, because poor
performance is more susceptible to tangible proof. Nonetheless, an assumption that dealer performance evidence of both types could be expected to shed
light on possible free-rider problems in many of these cases seemed appropriate.
An attempt first was made to identify situations in which substantial credible
evidence regarding the terminated dealer's performance indicated that he actually was a free rider. In the price category, one of 47 distribution systems
(2.1%) was so identified; when maximum price restrictions were excluded, one
of 31 (3.2%) was found. None was so identified in the nonprice category.
Examining the dealer performance evidence from an opposite perspective,
an effort then was made to identify situations in which there appeared to be
a clear absence of free riding. In the price category, this identification was made
in 3 out of 47 distribution systems (6.4%). When maximums were excluded,
3 out of 31 (9.7 %) were found. In the nonprice category, the identification was
made in one of 66 situations (1.5%); when pure exclusive dealerships were
eliminated, the proportion was 1 of 44 (2.3%).
The small number of situations in which evidence was found relating to
the presence or absence of free riding was somewhat surprising. Because the
effort was made from opposite perspectives, and the numbers were so small
from both views, it must be concluded that my assumptions about the likely
Published
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ror, and that this characteristic was not testable from the data available in the
study. Logic seemed to support the assumption, but the facts did not.
Dealer Pressure
Although the proposition would stir lively debate, it can be argued that
a distribution restriction is less justifiable when dealer pressure plays a significant role in its origin or enforcement. 4 9 The rationale for such an argument
is that in such a case the restriction is less likely to have been motivated by
a desire to enhance distribution efficiency, either when the restriction was initially implemented or later when it was enforced. When less likely to have been
so motivated, the restriction is less likely to have that positive effect and more
likely to have negative effects. In addition, where evidence of dealer pressure
is present, there may be a greater likelihood of dealer collusion even though
there is insufficient evidence of such.
Evidence of dealer pressure relating to enforcement is much more likely
to be present than evidence of dealer pressure to originate a restriction. As
previously discussed, in a representative case involving the supplier's termination of the plaintiff-dealer, the factual background developed by the court frequently details the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff-dealer's termination, including the role that other dealers may have played. In such a case it
is not nearly so likely that background evidence would include references to
the role dealers may have played in the initial institution of the restriction.
Moreover, dealer pressure is more likely to have actually played a role in the
enforcement than in the institution of a restriction. When exploring the purposes and effects of a distribution restriction, however, it is not meaningful
to distinguish between institution and enforcement, because an appropriate inference about the supplier's motivation and an accurate measure of the restriction's effects can only be made by examining the actual operation and enforcement of the restriction. What is expressed in a distribution agreement must
be interpreted in light of what was done subsequently. Thus, no attempt was
made to differentiate the stages at which manifested dealer pressure occurred.
In the price category, evidence of substantial dealer pressure (but not dealer
collusion) was found in 3 of 47 distribution systems (6.4%); when maximums
were excluded, it was found in the same 3 systems out of a total of 31 (9.7%).
In the nonprice category, 4 of 66 systems (6.1%) were identified as being characterized by dealer pressure; when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated,
the proportion was 2 of 44 (4.5 %). The incidence of dealer pressure, without
49

See A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach., 653 F2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100
BORK, supra note 1,at 289; NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, VER-

FT.C. 68, 212-13 (1982); R.
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§ 4.4 (1985); Cann, supra note 4, at 512-13. But see Liebeler, Intrabrand

"Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1982); Ornstein, supra note 10 (both seeing lithttp://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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evidence of dealer collusion, was both low and essentially uniform across categories.
IntrabrandDealer Collusion
Although challenged by some observers in recent years, the traditional view
is that distribution restrictions are not economically or legally justifiable when
these restrictions are energized or strongly influenced by dealer collusion. 0
This view has long been reflected in legal standards that treat such activity as
horizontal rather than vertical. 5 ' Such a distinction is important, of course, any
time legal standards are different for vertical and horizontal restraints of trade,
as is the case with post-1977 standards for nonprice restrictions.
As with several other types of evidence, if evidence of dealer collusion
does exist in a given situation, a plaintiff challenging the supplier's distribution restriction normally should have an incentive to produce such evidence.
And once again, such evidence would be relevant to the issue of how the restriction was operationalized. During the 1967-77 period this type of evidence usually
would not affect the choice of legal standard because the per se rule applied
to both vertical price and nonprice restrictions, and recasting the restriction
as horizontal would not change this standard. Even when legal standards are
the same, however, horizontal restraints have been and continue to be viewed
with greater aversion than vertical ones. Thus, a plaintiffs successful effort
to characterize a restriction as horizontal would place the restriction, the supplier, and other dealers in a worse light and greatly emphasize the plaintiffs
role as a victim. The importance of a jury's, or even a judge's, overall perceptions of the parties' relative culpabilities should not be underestimated and is
well known to the trial lawyer.
A situation was identified as involving intrabrand dealer collusion if there
was either substantial evidence in the case itself that dealers were acting in
concert or a reference by the court to another proceeding in which dealers had
been charged with conspiracy. Dealers' collusive activity was presumed to be
purely intrabrand unless other evidence indicated probable interbrand dealer
collusion.
Although intrabrand dealer collusion should raise the law's level of concern about the vertical restriction under which they operate only if the former
is related to the latter, one can logically expect such a relationship to exist in
virtually every case. In this study, even if the evidence did not clearly show
a link between the intrabrand dealer collusion and the challenged distribution
restriction, such a link was presumed because it is fundamentally counterin50

See supra note ii.
5' See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Plymouth
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tuitive to think that a vertical restriction limiting intrabrand competition among
dealers would be unrelated to an agreement among those same dealers also
to limit intrabrand competition.
In the price category, 4 of 47 systems (8.5 %) were identified as involving
intrabrand dealer collusion; the proportion was 3 of 31 (9.7 %) when maximum
restrictions were excluded. In the nonprice category, 1 of 66 systems (1.5%)
was so identified; when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated no system
was found with this characteristic. Again, the overall proportions were quite
low. Although the incidence of perceived intrabrand collusion was somewhat
higher in the price category, the difference probably is not sufficient to form
the basis for any substantive inferences.
Interbrand Dealer Collusion
Because maintenance of interbrand competition is the ultimate goal of antitrust, distribution restrictions necessarily should cause greater concern when
the evidence indicates the presence of interbrand dealer collusion. There probably is a greater chance of a given instance of interbrand dealer collusion being completely unrelated to the distribution restriction under challenge than
of an occurrence of intrabrand dealer collusion being unrelated to the distribution restriction. It also is probably true that evidence of interbrand dealer collusion should have the greatest impact on how the vertical restriction is viewed
when the evidence also shows a link between the interbrand collusion and the
vertical restriction.
On the other hand, even if the evidence showing probable interbrand dealer
collusion does not also show a connection with the challenged vertical restriction, the mere presence of interbrand dealer collusion evidence must heighten
the economic and legal concern about the vertical restriction. The reason for
this concern even without establishment of a direct connection is that the sole
justification for distribution restrictions is to enhance interbrand competition;
this is the only reason for tolerating the limitation of intrabrand competition.
If interbrand competition in the relevant market at the dealer level has been
restricted by collusion, the only policy justification for the vertical restriction
has already been seriously undermined. Moreover, even though a relationship
between the challenged vertical restriction and evidence of interbrand collusion seemed to be present in some cases, an attempt to separate those cases
in which such a link existed from those in which it did not would have involved
too much speculation to treat the linkage as a testable characteristic. For these
reasons, no such separation was attempted.
A situation in which substantial credible evidence indicated collusion among
dealers or distributors was treated as involving interbrand rather than just intrabrand competition if there was evidence showing either that 1) the collusion
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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or distributors handling multiple brands, with no indication that only one brand
was involved.
In the price category, 2 of 47 situations (4.3%) were identified as involving interbrand dealer collusion; when maximums were excluded, the same 2
out of a total of 31 (6.5%) were so identified. In the nonprice category, 3 of
66 situations (4.5%) were identified; when pure exclusive dealerships were
eliminated the proportion was 2 of 44 (4.5%). These proportions were both
low and uniform among categories. It is likely, however, that the lower probability of interbrand dealer collusion being closely related to the challenged vertical restriction would create a correspondingly lower probability that evidence
of such collusion would be revealed in the vertical restriction case. Therefore,
the findings could be in error on the low side.
Recognizing that imprecision in the evidence may cause the lines between
dealer pressure, intrabrand dealer collusion, and interbrand dealer collusion
to be rather fuzzy, an aggregation of these characteristics may provide a more
accurate picture of the role played by downstream channel members.
The intrabrand and interbrand collusion factors first were aggregated. In
the price category, this combination yielded 6 of 47 systems (12.8%); when
maximum price restrictions were excluded, the combined proportion was 5 of
31 (16.1%). In the nonprice category, the combined proportion was 4 of 66 (6.1%);
when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated the proportion was 2 of 44

(4.5%).
All three dealer-involvement characteristics then were aggregated. In the
price category, the combined proportion was 9 of 47 systems (19.1%); when
maximums were excluded, the combined proportion was 8 of 31 (25.8%). In
the nonprice category, the combined proportion was 8 of 66 (12.1%); when pure
exclusive dealerships were eliminated the proportion was 4 of 44 (9.1%). Thus,
when the three dealer-involvement characteristics were aggregated, the findings
were less uniform between the price and nonprice categories than when any
of the three characteristics was examined individually. Dealer involvement was
greater in the case of price restrictions, but not overwhelmingly so. One also
must recognize the possibility that this greater proportion of dealer involvement in the price restrictions category could be due to the propensity for dealer
expressions to focus on price regardless of the exact nature of the distribution
restrictions being used.
InterbrandSupplier Collusion
Facilitation of collusion at the supplier level is one of the traditionally
recognized dangers of vertical restrictions, especially of resale price
maintenance.5 2 As with interbrand dealer collusion, any given occurrence of
52 See supra note 10.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 21 [1988], Iss. 2, Art. 1
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:2

interbrand supplier collusion probably is less likely to be related to the challenged
distribution restriction and, therefore, less likely to be revealed by the evidence
in a vertical restraint case than is an occurrence of either intrabrand collusion
or any of the other characteristics tested for in this study. Resulting proportions, therefore, could be in error on the low side.
As was done when testing for dealer collusion, a situation was identified
as involving interbrand supplier collusion if there was either substantial evidence
in the case itself that suppliers were acting in concert or a reference by the
court to another proceeding in which suppliers had been charged with conspiracy.
In the price category, evidence viewed as being sufficient to permit an inference of supplier collusion was found in 5 of 47 situations (10.6%); when
maximums were excluded, the same 5 were identified out of a total of 31 (16.1%).
In the nonprice category, the proportion was 5 of 66 (7.6%); when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated the proportion was 3 of 44 (6.8%). Thus,
the incidence of possible supplier collusion was a bit greater in the price category
but, again, the difference was not great.
Other Evidence of Interbrand Effect
An attempt also was made to identify distribution systems in which, despite
the absence of evidence indicating interbrand dealer or supplier collusion, there
was other evidence indicating possible interbrand effects resulting from the
challenged distribution restriction. An example of the type of case in which
other evidence was viewed as sufficient to infer a possible interbrand effect
is found in Swettlen v. Wagoner Gas & Oil, Inc. 53 In this case in which a retail
gasoline dealer sued its wholesaler for resale price maintenance, the wholesaler
completely controlled retail price under a formula for computing wholesale
and retail margins. The wholesaler marketed Phillips petroleum products, but
had been negotiating a possible switch to Sun, another refiner. Ultimately,
Phillips gave in to the wholesaler's demands to implement the margin formula
by which the wholesaler was able to control retail price. In return, the wholesaler
ceased negotiations with Sun, the intrabrand price restriction thus affecting
interbrand refiner competition for wholesale outlets. This effect could be viewed
in different ways, of course. One view is that the wholesaler's actions in playing one refiner against another simply reflected the operation of interbrand competition in setting the price that refiners were willing to pay for the wholesaler's
services. The wholesaler was able to have that price bid up, and this price included not only the wholesaler's margin but also the wholesaler's control over
retail price.
On the other hand, one might wonder about the legitimacy of a wholesaler
using an apparent degree of market power to affect downstream resale prices
53369 F Supp. 893 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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rather than using it only to bid up its own margin. The case also can lead to
a question about the insularity with which intrabrand competition is sometimes
viewed.5 4 There clearly was an interrelationship between interbrand and intrabrand competition in the case, and it produced higher prices. Whether it
also produced a greater quantity or quality of service could not be determined.
In the price category, noncollusion evidence indicating possible interbrand
effects was identified in 3 of 47 systems (6.4%); when maximums were excluded, the same 3 were identified out of a total of 31 (9.7%). In the nonprice
category, 2 of 66 systems (3.0 %) were so identified; when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated the proportion was 1 of 44 (2.3 %). The proportions were
low, without any striking differences across categories.
Initially, cases in which exclusive dealing or tying were involved along with
price or nonprice restrictions on intrabrand competition were treated as indicating
possible interbrand effects. After further reflection, however, these cases were
segregated and are discussed below.
At this point, another aggregation of factors may be of value. Those situations in which interbrand dealer collusion, interbrand supplier collusion, and
other evidence of interbrand effects were identified may be aggregated to form
a global interbrand-effect characteristic. In the price category, this combined
proportion was 8 of 47 (17.0%) (the sum was 10, but 2 were duplicates); when
maximums were excluded, the same 8 were identified out of a total of 31 (25.8 %)
(again, the sum was 10, but 2 were duplicates). In the nonprice category, the
combined proportion was 10 of 66 (15.2%); when pure exclusive dealerships
were eliminated the proportion was 6 of 44 (13.6%). This aggregation obviously increases the proportions substantially and decreases the uniformity across
categories but, again, the differences between the price and nonprice categories
cannot be called striking.
Combined with Exclusive Dealing or Tying
As discussed earlier, distribution systems in which exclusive dealing or
tying was the only type of restriction challenged were excluded from the study
because the primary focus of such restrictions is interbrand. Those systems
involving exclusive dealing or tying in addition to a price or nonprice intrabrand
restriction were retained for study. Initially, a decision was made to treat the
coterminous existence of exclusive dealing or tying as evidence of an interbrand effect. Upon further reflection, however, this view was discarded as superficial because the addition of exclusive dealing or tying to an intrabrand price
or nonprice restriction is likely to have highly ambiguous effects that will depend on a number of other variables.
54 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977); UNITED STATES
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES § 2.1 (1985); Liebeler, supra note 1.
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For example, if a dealer markets a product under a resale price maintenance
arrangement and probably would handle multiple brands but for an exclusive
dealing clause limiting the dealer to the products of its present supplier, the
exclusive dealing may prevent some interbrand price comparisons by consumers
that would be more easily accomplished through a multibrand dealer. Thus,
there could be a lessening of interbrand competition's disciplining effect on
the intrabrand restriction. Although price advertising would be expected to overcome much of this barrier, consumer search costs involved in comparing prices
would be somewhat higher because of exclusive dealing. Also, it has been argued
that the use of resale price maintenance to facilitate supplier collusion is likely
55
only when combined with exclusive dealing
The effect could differ, however, with the introduction of other variables.
The competitive consequences of dealer collusion, for example, are not likely
to expand beyond an intrabrand effect if these dealers operate under exclusive
dealing arrangements. Conversely, the consequences are more likely to extend
to interbrand effects if these dealers handle multiple brands. It must be recognized, of course, that the presence or absence of exclusive dealing in such cases
represents less of an underlying cause of these observed effects than a symptom of varying supplier-dealer bargaining power relationships and varying
marketing necessities in different markets. Even if the presence or absence of
exclusive dealing serves primarily as a symptom of conditions that may decrease
the adverse effects of dealer collusion, however, identification of exclusive dealing
as an adjunct restriction has evidentiary value.
Similar ambiguities can exist in the case of tying, and also in the nonprice
restriction context, and the introduction of other variables can further expand
the number of possible outcomes.
Consequently, distribution systems in which exclusive dealing or tying existed in addition to intrabrand price or nonprice restrictions were identified
separately. The variability of the potential effects of such a combination of restrictions is such that the drawing of any firm conclusions from the identification
of these combinations is fraught with uncertainty. Because there are some possible effects, however, the presence of such combinations of distribution restrictions is a phenomenon worth noting.
In the price category, 7 of 47 distribution systems (14.9%) involved exclusive dealing or tying in addition to the intrabrand price restriction; when
maximums were excluded, the proportion was 4 of 31 (12.9%). In the nonprice
category, only 3 of 66 systems (4.5 %) were so identified; when pure exclusive
dealerships were eliminated the proportion was 3 of 44 (6.8%). Thus, exclusive
dealing or tying did seem to be combined with intrabrand price restraints more
frequently than with intrabrand nonprice restraints.
55See Bork, supra note I, at 411-12.
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Purely IntrabrandEffect
Finally, an identification was made of those distribution systems in which
all the available evidence indicated a purely intrabrand effect. Included were
those systems not identified with any of the three interbrand-effect characteristics
and not involving exclusive dealing or tying as an adjunct restriction.
In the price category, 32 of 47 systems (68.1%) were identified as including
no evidence that the distribution systems may have contributed to adverse interbrand effects; when maximum price restraints were excluded, the proportion was 19 of 31 (61.3%). In the nonprice category, the proportion was 53
of 66 (80.3%); when pure exclusive dealerships were eliminated the proportion was 35 of 44 (79.5%). There is a suggestion in these findings that nonprice restrictions may be less harmful because of a higher incidence of purely
intrabrand effect, although the difference in proportion between price and nonprice restrictions is far from overwhelming.
CONCLUSION

This study attempted to isolate a relevant sample of distribution systems
containing restrictions on intrabrand competition and segregated the sample
into price and nonprice categories. In an effort to determine whether there is
a factual basis for the different antitrust standards applied to resale price
maintenance and vertical nonprice restrictions, the study then tested for the
presence of characteristics that might indicate whether the purposes and effects of intrabrand price restrictions differ in significant ways from those of
intrabrand nonprice restrictions.
The most important findings of the study may be interpreted and summarized
as follows:
1) Excluding maximum vertical price fixing from the price restrictions
category usually had little effect on the results as they related to price restrictions.
2) Excluding pure exclusive dealerships from the nonprice restrictions
category had practically no effect on the results as they related to nonprice
restrictions.
3) A substantially greater proportion of distribution systems in the nonprice category were characterized by suppliers with market power, but a substantially greater proportion of systems in the price category were characterized
by established products. The probable imprecision involved in making the market
power-established product distinction from the available evidence may cause
the aggregation of the two categories to be more meaningful. When the two
characteristics were combined, the price category had the greater proportion
of identified systems, but the amount by which this proportion exceeded that
was not striking.
category 1988
of theby nonprice
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4) Regarding the aggregated market power-established product
characteristic, although the difference between the price and nonprice categories
was not great, the overall proportion of restricted distribution systems characterized by suppliers with market power or established products was very large.
Thus, the findings on this point probably do not support different legal rules
for price and nonprice restrictions, and lend credence to the argument that a
uniform policy toward vertical restraints should be adopted. Significantly,
however, these findings may support an argument that any proposed uniform
standard for all vertical restrictions should contain stronger presumptions against
such restrictions than currently are used for intrabrand nonprice restraints. In
other words, according to the findings on this matter, current standards may
treat resale price maintenance too harshly and vertical nonprice restraints too
leniently. However, when drawing unified conclusions about vertical restrictions in the aggregate, rather than comparing price and nonprice restrictions,
the sampling of only those distribution restrictions that had been legally challenged could bias the results toward a greater incidence of market power and
established products.
5) Evidence that either price or nonprice restrictions were used to facilitate
market entry was found in an extremely small number of situations. Again,
these findings do not support the existing difference in the legal standards applied to price and nonprice restrictions. The findings on this point do seem
to confirm the overall findings on the aggregated market power-established product characteristic.
6) The assumption that the court's development of factual background in
vertical restraints cases would contain sufficient dealer-performance evidence
to enable the study to test for the presence or absence of free riding apparently
was in error. No conclusions could be drawn on this matter.
7) The identification of dealer involvement in the operation of vertical
restrictions involved an assessment of three characteristics: dealer pressure,
intrabrand dealer collusion, and interbrand dealer collusion. When each was
examined individually, proportions were very low and there were no large differences between the price and nonprice categories. When the two dealer collusion characteristics were aggregated, the overall proportions still were not
very large, and the proportion was only slightly greater in the price category
than in the nonprice category. When all three dealer-involvement characteristics
were aggregated, the incidence of occurrence in the price category was noticeably
higher than in the nonprice category. This finding must be tempered by the
fact that dealer expressions regarding their relations with the supplier and with
other dealers often focus on price regardless of the underlying cause for the
expressions. The findings on this point also do not provide strong support for
the existing dichotomy in legal standards, and the overall proportions across
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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tions commonly originate at the dealer level.
8) The incidence of possible supplier collusion was somewhat greater in
the price category than in the nonprice category, but the difference was not
striking. The overall proportion across categories was not large, but perhaps
was of sufficient magnitude to indicate that the occurrence of supplier collusion along with vertical restrictions is not rare.
9) Miscellaneous evidence of interbrand effects connected with intrabrand
restrictions indicated a very low rate of occurrence. When this characteristic
was combined with the interbrand supplier collusion and interbrand dealer collusion characteristics to produce an aggregated interbrand-effects characteristic,
the incidence was somewhat higher in the price category, but not large enough
to provide any substantial support for different legal standards. The overall proportion across categories, about 1 out of 6, indicates that possible interbrand
effects are neither common nor rare.
10) Exclusive dealing or tying was found in conjunction with resale price
maintenance more frequently than with nonprice restrictions, but the difference
was not great. The possible effects of the combination are so variable that no
conclusions can be drawn.
11) Overall, the results of the study do not provide strong support for the
different legal standards applied to resale price maintenance and vertical nonprice restrictions. Aside from this overall conclusion, the most interesting finding is that vertical restrictions are most commonly used by firms that either
have substantial market power or market an established product. Vertical restrictions appear to be used to facilitate market entry only rarely.
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TABLE 1
PRICE RESTRICTIONS

N = 47
Total
No.

(%)

16, 41, 44

3

(6.4%)

Characteristic
Supplier Had
Substantial Market
Power
Established Product 7, 8, 9,
(but no clear evidence 18, 19,
26, 27,
of substan-market
36, 37,
power)
New Product or New
Geographic Market
Evidence of Actual
Free Riding
Evidence Indicating
Definite Absence of
Free Riding
Evidence of Substantial Dealer Pressure
(but no collusion)
Evidence of Intrabrand Dealer
Collusion
Evidence of Interbrand Dealer
Collusion
Evidence of Interbrand Supplier
Collusion
Other Evidence Indicating Interbrand
Effect
Plus Exclusive Dealing or Tying
Evidence Indicating Only Intrabrand Effect

Total No. & %

Distribution System
(Numbers Referenced
To Appendix A)

Combinations

32 (68.1%)
10, 11,
20, 21,
28, 29,
38, 39,

12,
22,
30,
43,

13,
23,
32,
46,

14
25
33
47

29 (61.7%)

0

(0.0%)

22

1

(2.1%)

24, 25, 28

3

(6.4%)

24, 39, 40

3

(6.4%)

5, 12, 27, 29

4

(8.5%)

1, 2

2

(4.3%)

1, 2, 12, 23, 35

3, 19, 40
4, 15, 21, 25, 31, 42, 43
5, 6,
14, 16,
28, 29,
37, 38,

For Selected

5 (10.6%)

3

(6.4%)

9 (19.1%)
6 (12.8%)

8 (17.0%)
(There were 10
items with the
three characteristics combined
here but 2 appeared twice)

7 (14.9%)

7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13
17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26 32 (68.1%)
30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36
39, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47
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2

PRICE RESTRICTIONS

(Excluding Maximum Vertical Price Fixing)
N = 31*

Characteristic
Supplier Had
Substantial Market
Power
Established Product
(but no clear evidence
of substanial market
power)
New Product or New
Geographic Market
Evidence of Actual
Free Riding
Evidence Indicating
Definite Absence of
Free Riding
Evidence of Substantial Dealer Pressure
(but no collusion)
Evidence of Intrabrand Dealer
Collusion
Evidence of Interbrand Dealer
Collusion

Distribution System
(Numbers Referenced
To Appendix A)
41

Total
No.

(%)

Total No. & %
For Selected
Combinations

1 (3.2%)
18 (58.1%)

7, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19
22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28
30, 33, 36, 39, 46

17

(54.8%)

0

(0.0%)

22

1

(3.2%)

24, 25, 28

3

(9.7%)

24, 39, 40

3

(9.7%)

5, 12, 27

3

(9.7%)

1, 2

2

(6.5%)

8 (25.8%)
5 (16.1%)

8 (25.8%)
Evidence of Interwere 10
(There
(16.1%)
5
35
23,
12,
2,
1,
brand Supplier
the
with
items
Collusion
three characteristics combined
Other Evidence In3 (9.7%) here, but 2 ap3, 19, 40
dicating Interbrand
peared twice)
Effect
4 (12.9%)
4, 15, 25, 42
Plus Exclusive Dealing or Tying
5, 7, 9, 13, 17, 18, 22
Evidence Indi19 (61.3%)
24, 26, 28, 30, 33, 35
cating Only In36, 39, 41, 45, 46, 47
trabrand Effect
*Although there are only 31 distribution systems represented in Table 2, the numbering
scheme of Table 1 was retained and, consequently, reference numbers in Table 2 go as
Published
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3

NONPRICE RESTRICTIONS

N = 66

Characteristic
Supplier Had
Substantial Market
Power
Established Product
(but no clear evidence
of substanial market
power)
New Product or New
Geographic Market
Evidence of Actual
Free Riding
Evidence Indicating
Definite Absence of
Free Riding
Evidence of Substantial Dealer Pressure
(but no collusion)
Evidence of Intrabrand Dealer
Collusion
Evidence of Interbrand Dealer
Collusion
Evidence of Interbrand Supplier
Collusion
Other Evidence Indicating Interbrand
Effect
Plus Exclusive Dealing or Tying
Evidence Indicating Only Intrabrand Effect

DistributionSystem
(Numbers Referenced
To Appendix B)
3, 4, 13, 15, 16
29, 34, 36, 41, 48
49, 56, 63, 65
2, 9, 14, 17
19, 24, 27, 30, 33
37, 38, 39, 50, 51
53, 57
12, 18, 42

59

Total
No.

(%)

Total No. & %
For Selected
Combinations

14 (21.2%)
30 (45.5%)
16 (24.2%)

3

(4.5%)

0

(0.0%)

1 (1.5%)

10, 23, 31, 36

4

(6.1%)
8 (12.1%)

15

1 (1.5%)
4(6.1%)

11, 16, 37

3

(4.5%)

1, 2, 9, 45, 49

5

(7.6%)

10, 36

2 (3.0%)

27, 39, 48

3 (4.5%)

3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31,
34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 42,
46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53,
56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
64, 65, 66

14,
23,
32,
43,
54,
62,

15
24
33 53 (80.3%)
44
55
63

10 (15.2%)

38

Allison: Vertical Price-Nonprice Dichotomy
VERTICAL PRICE-NONPRICE DICHOTOMY

Fall, 19871

TABLE 4
NONPRICE RESTRICTIONS

(Excluding Pure Exclusive Deal erships)

Characteristic
Supplier Had
Substantial Market
Power
Established Product
(but no clear evidence
of substanial market
power)
New Product or New
Geographic Market
Evidence of Actual
Free Riding
Evidence Indicating
Definite Absence of
Free Riding
Evidence of Substantial Dealer Pressure
(but no collusion)
Evidence of Intrabrand Dealer
Collusion
Evidence of Interbrand Dealer
Collusion
Evidence of Interbrand Supplier
Collusion
Other Evidence Indicating Interbrand
Effect
Plus Exclusive Dealing or Tying

N = 44*
DistributionSystem
(Numbers Referenced
To Appendix B)
3, 4, 13, 16, 29
41, 48, 49, 63, 65

7otal
No.

Total No. & %
For Selected

(%)

Combinations

10 (22.7%)
21 (47.7%)

9, 14, 24, 27
30, 37, 38, 39
51, 53, 57
42

11

1 (2.3%)
0

59

10, 31

(25.0%)

(0.0%)

1 (2.3%)

2

(4.5%)

0

(0.0%)

4 (9.1%)
2 (4.5%)
16, 37

2

(4.5%)

1, 9, 49

3

(6.8%)

10
27, 39, 48

6 (13.6%)

1 (2.3%)
3

(6.8%)

3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 20
21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31
35 (79.5%)
35, 38, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66
*Although there are only 44 distribution systems represented in Table 4, the numbering
Published
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APPENDIX A
PRICE RESTRICrIONS

Schnapp's Shop, Inc. v. H.W. Wright & Co., 377 E Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1973).
Liquor
Resale price maintenance
Probable supplier and interbrand dealer collusion: Although no conspiracies
proved, there was substantial evidence of organized pricing behavior
among competitors at both the wholesale and retail levels, Discounting
retailer won suit against two wholesalers for resale price maintenance.
2.

United States v. Wohl Shoe Co., 369 E Supp. 386 (D.N.M. 1974).
Shoes
Resale price maintenance
Substantial evidence of manufacturer cartel: Two manufacturers cooperated
in imposing resale price maintenance.
Obvious dealer collusion (interbrand) at retail

3.

Swettlen v. Wagoner Gas & Oil, Inc., 369 E Supp. 893 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Resale price maintenance: Wholesale jobber totally controlled resale price
at retail. Also, the method for setting wholesale jobber and retailer margins was negotiated by wholesaler with refiner (Phillips); refiner agreed
to the formulas to keep wholesaler from switching to a competitor (Sun).

4.

Stan Kane Home Improvement Center v. Martin Paint Stores, 1976-1 Tr.
Cas. 60,743 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Paint
Resale price maintenance: Defendant asserted state Fair Trade law obviously
as an afterthought, but could not use fair trade protection because it
set resale prices for all of the products handled by plaintiff, not just
for defendant's products.
Exclusive dealing

5.

Mt. Vernon Sundat v. Nissan Motor Corp., 1976-1 Tr. Cas. (CCH) 60,842
(E.D. Va. 1975), vacated, 1977-1 Tr. Cas. (CCH) 61,507 (E.D. Va.).
Automobiles
Resale price maintenance
Probable dealer collusion (intrabrand)

Burton Supply Co. v. Wheel Horse Prods., Inc., 1974 Tr. Cas. (CCH)
75,224 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
Garden and lawn equipment
Maximum vertical price fixing: Manufacturer required that wholesalers
grant retailers a discount of at least 27%; however, there was no apparent attempt by the manufacturer to put a ceiling on retailers'prices.
The manufacturer's reasons for thus increasing retailers' margins at the
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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7.

Douglas T.V. Hi-Fi Stereo Center v. U.S. Pioneer Elecs., 1974 Tr. Cas.
(CCH) 74,995 (D.D.C. 1974).
Stereo equipment
Resale price maintenance
Same distribution system and restrictions examined in:
Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. U.S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp., 1973 Tr. Cas.
(CCH) 74,848 (D.D.C. 1973)

8.

Richardson v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 1974 Tr. Cas. (CCH) 75,116 (E.D. Mo.
1974).
Newspapers
Maximum vertical price fixing: Court found insufficient evidence of actual enforcement, but defendant had showed a definite interest in controlling maximum resale prices.
The lack of evidence relating to enforcement of maximum prices was likely
attributable to the fact that the real dispute in this case developed from
the desire of this and other carriers to stop distributing the Saturday
edition. Their reasons were not clear.

9.

United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1973 Tr. Cas. (CCH)
Ohio 1973).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Resale price maintenance

10. Dahl v. Hearst Corp., 1973 Tr. Cas. (CCH)
Newspapers - wholesale
Maximum vertical price fixing
Areas of primary responsibility
11.

74,692 (N.D.

74,322 (C.D. Cal. 1972).

Westphalen v. Mobil Oil Corp., 1973 Tr. Cas. (CCH)
1972).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Maximum vertical price fixing

74,423 (N.D. Cal.

12. Crown Central Petrol. Corp. v. Brice, 427 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Va. 1977).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Resale price maintenance: Although this case was tried on a maximum
price fixing theory, evidence from other cases involving the same distribution system indicates that the supplier's resale price control was not
limited to maximums, but involved complete control; this system, therefore, is classified as one involving traditional resale price maintenance.
Evidence of dealer collusion to push price above supplier's maximum
Same distribution system also examined in:
Phillips v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 396 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md.
1975)
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
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Evidence in this case showed that although Crown tried to keep its prices
down, and thus used maximum vertical price fixing, it also exercised
control to prevent price wars and keep prices up; it controlled resale
price, period.
Evidence of supplier collusion: Much evidence, and court specifically
found, a horizontal price fixing conspiracy among independent gasoline
marketers in Maryland to prevent price wars (keep prices up).
13.

Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975).
Newspapers
Resale price maintenance: Both maximum and minimum; publisher set
prices, period.
Exclusive territories
Also, a form of customer resale restriction: Differential pricing system
kept home delivery distributors from reselling in street dealer market.

14. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
Beer
Maximum vertical price fixing: Manufacturer pressure to keep prices down
to level of other "popular" brands, although court found insufficient
evidence of vertical price fixing.
Territorial resale restrictions
15. Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
Beer
Resale price maintenance at wholesale and retail
Territorial resale restrictions at wholesale
Exclusive dealing on light draught beer at retail
16. Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 942 (1976)
Coffee
Maximum vertical price fixing
Exclusive territories
Wholesale distributors served both retail accounts and large institutional
buyers, but maximum vertical price fixing was limited to institutional
accounts; distributors, in effect, had to subsidize institutional accounts
by higher prices on retail accounts.
General Foods was the largest processor and marketer of coffee in the U.S.,
with 45% of the retail market and 10% of the institutional market.
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Coffee was marketed quite differently to institutional buyers. The coffee
was not vacuum-packed as it was for retail, had a shorter shelf-life, and
consequently had to be rotated. Also, distributors often maintained coffeemaking equipment on the premises of institutional customers. Thus, institutional accounts required substantially more service than retail accounts, but manufacturer put pressure on distributors to keep prices lower
in market where more service was required. This phenomenon is apparently explained by the manufacturer's dominant position in the retail
market (45%) and its strong but nondominant position in the institutional market; it faced greater competition in the institutional market.
17. Tamaron Distrib. Co. v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1969).
Toys
Resale price maintenance
18. Butera v. Sun Oil Co., 496 F.2d 434 (1st Cir. 1974).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Resale price maintenance: de facto by controlling dealer margin.
19. Oreck v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 946 (1978).
Vacuum cleaners
Resale price maintenance: The court treated this case as one involving only
an exclusive distributorship. The evidence demonstrated, however, that
the distributor was terminated by Whirlpool because of pressure from
Sears & Roebuck. Sears sold private label vacuum cleaners made by
Whirlpool, and Sears was concerned about the distributor's prices on
branded Whirlpool vacuum cleaners. Sears' pressure on Whirlpool was
clearly price-motivated, as was the ultimate termination of the distributor. This case, therefore, was treated as one involving resale price
maintenance.
20. O.M. Droney Beverage Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 365 F Supp. 1067 (D.
Minn. 1973).
Beer
Maximum vertical price fixing
Areas of primary responsibility
21.

Hamamciyan v. Mobil Oil Corp., 1973-2 Tr. Cas. (CCH)
Cal. 1973).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Maximum vertical price fixing
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22. Blackwelder Furn. Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).
Furniture ("contemporary upholstered" for residential use)
Resale price maintenance: Termination of retail dealer by wholesale
distributor was specifically for discounting.
Evidence of actual free riding by terminated dealer
This brand was one of dealer's top three lines, accounting for 35 % of sales.
23. Krutsinger v. Mead Foods, 546 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1976).
Bread (wholesale to sandwich makers & restaurants)
Resale price maintenance: Oklahoma had a Fair Trade law, but it apparently
did not figure in supplier's motivation, because there was no fair trade
agreement. The court ultimately held the law to be inapplicable, anyway,
because of dual distribution.
Suggestion of collusion among manufacturers: Mead was pressured by Rainbow, a competitor, to maintain resale prices.
24. Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510 (10th
Cir. 1976)
Automobiles
Resale price maintenance: Dealer was terminated because of discounting;
there had been complaints about this discounting from the two other
dealers in the area.
Evidence showed customer satisfaction, apparently no problem with dealer's
service or promotion; no evidence to the contrary.
25. Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 935 (1976).
(Defendants were Phillips Electronic Instruments Corp. and North
American Phillips, Inc.)
Three lines of sophisticated electronic instruments:
1. scientific and analytical; 2. industrial; 3. medical.
Resale price maintenance
Territorial resale restrictions
Exclusive dealing
Court specifically found no health or safety reasons for assuring adequate
service (but there was no evidence that plaintiff was not providing adequate service).
26. Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.
1973).
Forklift trucks
Resale price maintenance
Exclusive distributorship
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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27. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
943 (1973).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Resale price maintenance
Dealer collusion: Indictments for horizontal price fixing through three
dealer associations.
28. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1077 (1972).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Resale price maintenance: de facto through control of dealer's margin; it
was clearly minimum resale price fixing, not maximum. (Gulf had used
a consignment system until Simpson v. Union Oil, 377 U.S. 13 (1964),
in which the Supreme Court held that a consignment system could not
be used as a guise for resale price maintenance.)
Evidence clearly showed that service was not Gulf's motive, and that there
was no free riding.
29. A.S. Abell Co. v. Chell, 412 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1969).
Newspapers
Maximum vertical price fixing
Exclusive territories
Evidence of distributor collusion to raise price above publisher's maximum.
30. Anaya v. Las Cruces Sun News, 455 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1972).
Newspapers
Resale price maintenance: Because a newspaper was involved, one would
expect that the price restraint was a maximum one, but the evidence
did not so indicate.
Exclusive territories
31.

Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971).
Dairy products (through convenience stores)
Maximum vertical price fixing: Actually caused franchisees to sell well
below cost; could have been a loss leader strategy.
Exclusive dealing and tying

32. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc. 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 910 (1977).
Newspapers
Maximum vertical price fixing
Territorial restrictions
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33. Stan Togut Corp. v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 398 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Equipment for food processing and preparation: Distributor sold directly
to supermarkets, commercial kitchens, and restaurants. (There also was
a line of small home appliances for food preparation; method of distribution for these was unstated.)
Resale price maintenance
Territorial and customer restrictions
34. Capital Temporaries of Hartford, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 383 F. Supp. 902
(D. Conn. 1974).
Temporary employee services
Maximum vertical price fixing (on national accounts)
Exclusive territories
35. Sunny Hill Farms Dairy Co. v. Kraftco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 845 (E.D.
Mo. 1974).
Milk
Resale price maintenance
Substantial evidence of supplier collusion: Agreement on price plus agreement to institute vertical price fixing.
36. Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F Supp. 220 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), aff'd, 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975).
Patent on process for chemical embossing
Price restrictions in patent license:
1. Restrictions on royalty rate licensee could charge to sublicensee;
2. Restrictions on royalty rate patent owner would subsequently charge
to other licensees (most favored licensee clause).
37. Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977).
Newspapers
Maximum vertical price fixing
Territorial and customer resale restrictions
38. Hardin v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 426 F Supp. 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1977),
aff'd, 572 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978).
Newspapers
Maximum vertical price fixing
Territorial restrictions
39. Freed Oil Co. v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 419 E Supp. 479 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), vacated, 1977 Tr. Cas. (CCH) 61,758 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
Motor Oil (Penn grade)
Resale price maintenance with respect to sales to discount stores
Territorial restrictions
Price restrictions were the result of pressure from retail service stations,
although there was no direct evidence of dealer collusion.
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40. Continental Distrib. Co. v. Somerset Importers, 411 F. Supp. 754 (N.D.
Ill. 1976).
Liquor (imported)
Resale price maintenance: At both wholesale and retail levels.
Pressure from retail dealers, and probable pressure from surviving (nonterminated) wholesaler, but no direct evidence of dealer collusion.
41.

United States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Large lamps (light bulbs, fluorescent tubes, etc.)
Resale price maintenance
G.E. still had at least 50% of the market in early 1970s.

42. Ammerman v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
Liquid cleaning products
Resale price maintenance
Customer resale restrictions: Distributors could not resell to stores or across
the counter.
Exclusive dealing
43. Lepore v. New York News, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Newspapers
Maximum vertical price fixing
Exclusive territories
Exclusive dealing
44. Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Tex.
1972).
Beer
A form of maximum vertical price fixing
45. Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
Photographic equipment
Resale price maintenance
Territorial resale restrictions
46. Garrett's, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 412 F. Supp. 656 (D.S.C. 1976).
Men's clothing
Resale price maintenance
47. Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
Trucks and farm equipment
A form of maximum vertical price fixing, although price seemed to be
a secondary concern of the manufacturer.
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B

NONPRICE RESTRIcTIONS

1.

United States v. Glaxo Group, 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
Patented fungicide drug for humans and animals
A type of intrabrand nonprice restriction: In patent licenses and sublicenses,
there was a prohibition against resale of physical product in bulk form.
Licenses were accompanied by physical sale in bulk form; thus, restriction was on resale.
Agreement among manufacturers: Two British companies pooled their
patents and joined in the restrictions.

2.

Mages v. Spalding Sales Corp., 1975-2 Tr. Cas. (CCH) 60,579 (N.D.
Ill. 1975).
Golfing equipment
Exclusive dealership
Evidence suggested an understanding among manufacturers.

3.

Weather Wise Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 468 F.2d 716 (5th cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 990 (1973).
Coupling devices for connecting precharged air conditioner compressors
with other parts of air conditioning systems
A type of intrabrand nonprice restriction: Refusal to sell for resale; coupling
manufacturer would sell only to manufacturers of complete air conditioning systems.
This coupling manufacturer "controlled a substantial portion of the market,"
according to the court, and couplings were critical components.

4.

Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975).
Automobiles
Location clause
Same distribution system examined in:
Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 396 E Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd,
530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976).
Same distribution system also examined in:
Sheldon Pontiac v. General Motors Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J.
1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1976). (This case also revealed territorial exclusives; no dealer could be established within five miles of
another).

5.

Williams v. Independent News Co., 485 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1973).
Comic books
Restriction on customers to whom products could be resold

Paddington Corp. v. Major Brands, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Okla.
1973).
beverages (imported Scotch whiskey from England)
Alcoholic
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7.

Dreibus v. Wilson, 529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1975).
Imported Italian velvet used in furniture manufacturing
Exclusive distributorship for entire U.S.
In short domestic supply, and costly when imported, but there were several
Italian mills producing it for export to U.S.

8.

Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1975).
Sound and communications equipment for use in commercial establishments
De facto exclusive distributorship

9.

Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 440 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906 (1971).
Beer
Restriction on customers to whom products could be resold
Evidence of manufacturer collusion: Agreement among brewers to restrict
plaintiffs resale to Safeway (for unknown reasons).

10. Athlete's Foot of Delaware, Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., 445 F. Supp. 35
(D. Del. 1977).
Athletic footwear
Territorial resale restriction (de facto)
Had an interbrandeffect, because wholesale distributor not only would
not supply its brand to plaintiffs new second store, but used threatened
termination of supply at first store to prevent opening of second store.
Stores carried other brands, as well.
The entire occurrence resulted from pressure applied by the owner of
another store close to the location of plaintiff's proposed second store.
Thus, pressure from the dealer level was involved.
11.

Erewhon, Inc. v. Northeast Health Food Merchants, 428 F. Supp. 551 (D.
Mass. 1977).
Health and natural foods
Exclusive dealership
Coerced by dealers: Health food stores wanted to exclude food coops.
Evidence of dealer collusion
No evidence of reduced service or free riding by coops.

12. Akron Tire Supply Co. v. Gebr. Hofmann KG, 390 F. Supp. 1395 (N.D.
Ohio 1974) (supplemental opinion 1975).
Automobile wheel-balancing device
Exclusive territories
Introduction of new product
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Supermarket Servs., Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 382 F. Supp. 1248
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Pet supplies
Territorial resale restriction
Wholesaler (rack jobber) wanted to give retailers a choice of full service
(as had traditionally been done) or no service with lower price. The
manufacturer was upset, although all retailers chose traditional full service at higher price, and were given full service by the wholesaler.
Manufacturer was one of the industry leaders, with 1/3 of the market.

14. Fairfield County Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Narragansett Brewing Co.,
378 F Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1974).
Beer
Territorial resale restrictions
15. DeFilippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 912 (1975).
Automobiles
A type of exclusive dealership situation: Dealers in the area pressured
manufacturer not to grant a new dealership on proposed terms that would
have facilitated market entry (new dealer would have been permitted
to defer its part of the investment for three months).
Evidence of dealer collusion
16. Todhunter-Mitchell & Co., v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F Supp. 610 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), modified, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D.Pa. 1974).
Beer
Territorial resale restrictions
Apparent interbrand distributor collusion
Supplier was leading brewer in the nation with 19% of market.
17.

Bay City-Abrahams Bros., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 375 F Supp. 1206
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Cosmetics and toiletries
Exclusive territories

18.

Western Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Gibson Wine Co., 372 F. Supp. 802
(D.S.D. 1974).
Wine
Exclusive territories
Supplier was making a market entry.

19. Oak Distrib. Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Mich.
1973).
Beer
Exclusive territories
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20. American Indus. Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enter. Inc., 362 F. Supp. 32
(N.D. Ohio 1973).
Patented washer for threaded fasteners
Territorial resale restrictions: Patent license included restrictions that extended to the resale of the physical product itself.
License agreement also contained a provision for suggested resale prices
at retail, but at preliminary injunction stage there was no evidence as
to whether prices were enforced; thus, this was treated as a nonprice
restriction.
21.

Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 362 F Supp. 54 (D. Or. 1973).
Motorcycles
Territorial resale restrictions

22. Booth Bottling Co. v. Beverages Int'l, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
Syrup for carbonated soft drinks
Territorial resale restrictions
23. Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 450 F Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Patented cross-fluted packing material for use in evaporative cooling
mechanisms
A type exclusive distributorship: Patent owner sold physical product with
provision giving buyer exclusive right to use the product in manufacture of evaporative coolers for gas turbines of over 500 horsepower.
Exclusive was the result of pressure from the purchaser; purchaser had
actually wanted a more restrictive provision.
No apparent justification; manufacturer was not making a market entry,
technology was not difficult, and purchaser had no large investment to
recoup.
24. Tomac, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 418 E Supp. 359 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
Syrup for carbonated soft drinks
Territorial resale restrictions
25. Wisdom Rubber Indus., Inc. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 415 F. Supp.
363 (D. Hawaii 1976).
Irrigation pipe (two types: plastic and asbestos cement)
Exclusive territories
26. Skoda v. A & W Distrib. Co., 414 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Tex. 1976)
Syrup for carbonated soft drinks
Territorial restrictions on resale, plus exclusive territory
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27. Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Carbonated soft drinks (lemon-lime, for export to foreign countries)
Territorial resale restrictions
Exclusive dealing
Supplier (Seven-Up) had 80 %of lemon-lime soft drink sales in 1960 (data
from another case) and only 45% in 1972-73 (this case), but lemon-lime
is not a market by itself.
28. Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 410 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. 111. 1976),
rev'd, 637 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981).
Automotive tires, batteries and accessories (for resale to gasoline service
stations)
Exclusive territories
29. Cook v. Ralston Purina Co., 366 F. Supp. 999 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
Chicken feed (bulk sales to chicken raisers)
Territorial resale restrictions
Manufacturer (Ralston Purina) was the largest producer of animal feed
(bulk and bagged) in the nation.
30. Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 358 F. Supp. 290
(D. Colo. 1972).
Syrup for carbonated soft drinks
Territorial resale restrictions
31. Plastic Packaging Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 327 F. Supp. 213
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
Expanded polystyrene used for loose fill packing material (both processing and distribution)
Areas of primary responsibility: Some evidence of manufacturer interest
in keeping distributors within their territories, but court found that
manufacturer did not restrict distributor to the territory. Manufacturer
was clearly concerned about plaintiffs sales outside territory, but
manufacturer was very careful about how it dealt with the matter.
Some evidence of pressure from competing distributors: Other distributors
had a meeting, and plaintiffs selling outside its territory was discussed,
but court found that meeting was for another purpose.
32. Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972).
Fire extinguishers
Exclusive territories
33. United States v. Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, 309 F Supp.
1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Copyrighted features for newspapers (comics, columns, etc.)
Exclusive territories
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34. Top-All Varieties, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 301 E Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
Greeting cards
Exclusive territories: Hallmark refused to sell to another, newly opened
store in the area.
Manufacturer (Hallmark) was the largest in the country.
35. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 831 (1970).
Cosmetics for professional use (hair dyes, tints, conditioners, perms, setting lotions, etc., for use by barbers and beauticians)
Customer resale restriction: Prohibition of resale to public at retail
Some evidence of resale price maintenance, but plaintiff lost at summary
judgment stage on resale price maintenance claim, so this is treated as
a customer restriction case.
36. Holly Springs Funeral Home, Inc. v. United Funeral Serv., Inc., 303 F.
Supp. 128 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
Supplies for funeral homes
A type of exclusive territory
Probable pressure from monopolistic purchaser: Refusals by suppliers of
various items to sell to new funeral home were very uniform, and for
the same reason; they would not sell an item to a competitor of an existing customer. Evidence indicated dominance by the established funeral
home.
37. Oakland County Hearing Aid Servs. v. Sonotone Corp., 23 F.R.S.2d 1431
(E.D. Mich. 1977).
Hearing aids
Territorial and customer resale restrictions
Although this case was only at class certification stage, and no evidence
had been presented, a separate proceeding by the Federal Trade Commission corroborated the probable existence of territorial and customer
resale restrictions during this time period. See, In re Beltone Elec. Corp.,
100 F.T.C. 68 (1982). In this case, there was also an allegation of resale
price maintenance, but this claim was not corroborated by the separate
F.T.C. proceeding, so this case was treated as only involving territorial
and customer restrictions.
Evidence of dealer collusion: Court pointed out that two of the retail dealer
plaintiffs had been charged civilly and criminally by the Justice Department with horizontal price fixing.
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38. Clairol, Inc. v. Boston Discount Center of Berkeley, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 632
(E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 608 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1979).
Hair coloring preparations for professional use
Customer resale restrictions: Prohibition of resale to public (in this case,
Clairol sued several retailers to prevent them from selling to the public.
Same distribution system examined in:
Clairol, Inc. v. Asaro, 1975 Tr. Cas. (CCH) 60,350 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
39. Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 675 (D. Utah 1974), rev'd in part, 524
F2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
Gasoline and petroleum products
Territorial resale restrictions
Exclusive dealing (plaintiff and the court called it tying, but tying product
was the Shell trademark, so this was actually a form of exclusive dealing).
40. Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,681 (D. Or. 1973).
Machines for preparing and dispensing frozen carbonated beverages
Territorial resale restrictions
Suggested resale and sublease prices, but no evidence of enforcement or
of any real interest in controlling resale price. Territorial restrictions
were clearly the only substantive aspect of the distribution system.
41.

Alameda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,485 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
Electricity
Customer resale restriction: Utility refused to permit shopping mall owner
to submeter (resell) to tenants.

42. Mitchell v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,879 (S.D.
Ohio 1976).
Medical and surgical devices for use by physicians and hospitals (most
important product was a surgical stapler, but manufacturer also produced intravenous infusion sets and total hip prosthesis units).
Territorial resale restrictions: Area of primary responsibility, with total
ban on sales outside territory if such sales interfered with dealers sales
within his area.
New entrant: Manufacturer was the only producer of such a surgical stapler,
but product was still relatively new and potential users were still being
educated about it.
43. John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,505 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
Beer
Exclusive territories
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44. Roth Office Equip. Co. v. G.E Business Equip. Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,563 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
Metal office furniture
Exclusive territories
45. U.S. Elec. Supply Co. v. Maurice Elec. Supply Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,587 (D.D.C. 1975).
Electrical supplies and materials
A type of exclusive distributorship arrangement: Seven manufacturers
stopped selling to plaintiff wholesale distributor when they discovered
that plaintiffs principal financial backer was an electrical contractor.
Manufacturers had a uniform policy of selling only to wholesale
distributors and not to electrical contractors.
Evidence suggests manufacturer collusion, although not proved. In writer's
opinion, circumstances permit inference that there was some understanding among manufacturers.
Six wholesalers, competitors of plaintiff, were also named as defendants,
and there is the suggestion that they pressured manufacturers, but there
was no evidence of such pressure at preliminary injunction stage. Circumstances insufficient to infer collusion among, or even pressure from,
wholesalers.
46. United States v. Fisons Ltd., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,794 (N.D. I11.
1972).
Patented iron dextram in bulk form ("any collodial ferric hydroxide complexed with depolymerized dextram" for use in treating deficiency of
iron in humans and animals).
A type of intrabrand nonprice restriction: customers were prohibited from
reselling in bulk form, but could resell only in dosage form.
47. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974).
Computer software sale (franchised computer time-sharing systems)
Computer hardware rental (Hewlett-Packard 2000A CPU)
Territorial restrictions
48. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir.
1975).
Hotels and motels
Territorial restrictions
Exclusive dealing: Franchisees could not operate hotel or motel for anyone
else.
Franchisor (Holiday Inns) was the largest hotel-motel chain in U.S.
Same distribution system examined in:
Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,072 (W.D.
Tenn. 1976).
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49. United States v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1976).
Patented antihypertensive drug HCT in bulk form
A type of intrabrand nonprice restriction: prohibition against resale in bulk
form, and requirement that purchasers use the drug only in the production of combination or specialty drugs and not in straight form.
Manufacturer (Ciba) also licensed some firms to manufacture HCT for
use in combination or specialty drugs, not in straight form.
Manufacturer distributed through competitors, so the court treated it as
a horizontal restriction. Thus, there was manufacturer collusion.
Ciba was second largest producer in market for antihypertensive drugs,
but was losing market share. Ciba had 21% in 1969 and 18 % in 1974.
The largest, Merck, had 36% in 1969 and 45% in 1974. There were
8 producers in all; no other had more than 6%.
50. Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 522 F2d 1299 (5th
Cir. 1975).
Trading stamps
A type of exclusive territory: S & H would not let the plaintiff retailer
handle its stamps because a competing retailer at the same airport handled
S&H stamps.
An additional type of intrabrand nonprice restriction: Prohibition against
resale; in this case, it was a type of transshipment prohibition to enforce the de facto territorial exclusive, but S&H also had a general policy
against resale of its stamps.
51.

Reed Brothers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976).
Agricultural herbicides
Territorial and customer resale restrictions

52. Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 E2d 637 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973).
Control devices for automatic lawn sprinkler systems
Areas of primary responsibility: The extent to which exclusive distributors
were restricted to territories was not clear, but the case was characterized
as one involving a territorial resale restriction and not as one involving
a pure territorial exclusive because of the primary responsibility clause.
Exclusive territories
53. Pepsico, Inc. v. F.T.C., 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
876 (1973).
Syrup for carbonated soft drinks
Territorial resale restrictions
FTC had also filed complaints against most other producers in the nation.
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54. Ricchetti v. Meister Brau, Inc., 431 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 939 (1971).
Beer
Territorial resale restrictions: Although no violation proved, the evidence,
coupled with knowledge of industry practices, creates a strong suggestion that territorial resale restrictions did exist.
55. Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co. East, 542 F.2d
1053 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
Bookkeeping and consulting services for retail gasoline outlets
Territorial resale restrictions: Trademark and copyright licenses included
territorial restriction.
56. Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
Automobiles
Exclusive territories
57. Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated,
433 U.S. 904 (1977).
Newspapers
Territorial resale restrictions: Court remanded to determine whether there
were only areas of primary responsibility or territorial resale restrictions. It is probable that there were territorial resale restrictions because
all evidence indicated that dealer was doing an excellent job - had increased sales fourfold - and dealer resisted the splitting of his territory.
58. Morton Bldgs. of Nebraska v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910 (8th Cir.
1976).
Prefabricated wood-framed, metal-covered buildings
Territorial resale restrictions: Dealer could sell outside his territory as long
as he did not sell within 50 miles of another dealer. Apparently, territories were not contiguous; within this context, there were definite
territorial restrictions on resale.
59. World of Sleep, Inc. v. Stearns & Foster Co., 525 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1975).
Bedding products
Territorial resale restriction: Not express, and court found no violation,
but there obviously were de facto territorial resale restrictions. Plaintiff had a store in Denver and opened a new one in Atlanta. Manufacturer would not sell to plaintiffs store in Atlanta, plaintiff transshipped
from Denver to Atlanta, and manufacturer terminated plaintiff. Manufacturer said it did so out of loyalty to Rich's, a large department store in
Atlanta that carried the manufacturer's bedding. Evidence showed that
plaintiff was a very aggressive retailer, was very successful, and did
advertising. 1988
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60. Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir.
1975).
Non-asbestos fireproofing spray for buildings (district court determined
relevant market to be "all structural steel fireproofing materials").
A type of intrabrand nonprice restriction: Manufacturer sold only to
"licensees" - contractors who applied the material - and forbade them
from reselling the material. It apparently was customary in the industry
to not sell for resale.
61.

Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1977).
Malt liquor
Territorial and customer resale restrictions
Same distribution system examined in:
Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir.
1977).

62. Arkla Air Conditioning Co. v. Famous Supply Co., 551 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.
1977).
Air conditioners
Territorial resale restrictions
63. Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 548 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1977).
Acoustical ceiling products
Territorial resale restrictions
Manufacturer (Armstrong) was the largest producer of acoustical and nonacoustical ceiling products in the U.S.
64. Universal Brands, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 546 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1977),
reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1977).
Beer
Exclusive national distributorship
65. FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977).
Automobile "crash parts"
Restrictions on customers to whom dealers could resell the parts: Ford
dealers could receive an allowance on purchase of crash parts only if
they resold to independent repair shops, and not to parts wholesalers.
Thus, Ford dealers were effectively prevented from reselling to parts
wholesalers. Until 1968, Ford had imposed tighter customer resale restrictions; in response to pressure from the FTC, Ford changed the system
to give independent auto repair shops a chance to compete. In 1971 Ford
changed the system again; it continued to permit dealers to resell to independent auto repair shops, but effectively excluded parts wholesalers.
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66. Southeastern Hose, Inc. v. Imperial-Eastman Corp., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,479 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
Hydraulic hose assemblies
A type of intrabrand nonprice restriction: Coupling manufacturer apparently
put pressure on one of its large wholesale distributors to keep the
distributor from getting a component (hose) from the coupling manufacturer's suppliers and engaging in assembly in competition with coupling
manufacturer. Thus, coupling manufacturer attempted to restrict its
wholesale distributors from entering the assembly market and to limit
activities to pure wholesaling.
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